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SUMMARY 
This working paper is based on empirical research on 
translocal figurations of displacement in Ethiopia. It 
explores TRAFIG’s central question: “How are pro-
tractedness, dependency and vulnerability related 
to the factors of local and translocal connectivity 
and mobility, and, in turn, how can connectivity and 
mobility be utilised to enhance the self-reliance and 
strengthen the resilience of displaced people?” The 
paper presents findings from six camps in Tigray and 
Afar regional states, as well as urban refugees in Addis 
Ababa and several cities in Tigray.
The findings show that the capability to break free 
from protracted displacement is primarily determined 
by each refugee’s networks and connectivity. Local 
and translocal connectivity enable refugees to move 
out of camps, secure livelihoods, widen future chances 
and process their onward mobility. In the cities or in 
other countries in which displaced people temporarily 
or permanently settle, network contacts provide infor-
mation about job opportunities, support local integra-
tion, help to access business licenses informally and to 
cover costs of living. The extent of support provided 
through networks, however, depends on the quality of 
translocal/national social relations. Particularly, such 
connections that could avail of financial resources 
determine the pathways of refugees’ mobility. 
For those who have strong networks, camps are just 
a transit space where they process their onward 
mobility. Those who do not have strong networks are 
more susceptible to experiencing protracted waiting 
periods, diminished livelihood options and general 
vulnerability. Our study reveals that context is vital for 
mobility and translocal connectivity: Both dimensions 
need to be put in the context of previous histories 
of migration, bonds and alliances with the hosting 
communities, and the state of current political affairs. 
Against this backdrop, the study reveals significant 
differences between the three groups of Eritrean ref-
ugees we studied (Tigrinya, Afar and Kunama) in terms 
of their connectivity, mobility and vulnerability. 
KEYWORDS
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refugees, Out-of-camp-policy, refugee–host community 
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Introduction
While the international community was arguing about the 
extent of ongoing armed clashes and the scope of the humani-
tarian crisis in Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region, some refugees 
went back on foot to the country they had escaped from years 
ago—Eritrea. They did not go back because they wanted to or 
because anything had improved there. On the contrary, but with 
armed skirmishes closing in on them, they saw no other way to 
save their lives. For years, they had been stuck in camps close to 
the border without their hopes materialising, durable solutions 
in sight or at least a life in dignity guaranteed. 
As part of the project “Transnational Figurations of Displace-
ment” (TRAFIG), funded by the European Union and coordi-
nated by BICC, this working paper addresses the question of 
how protractedness, dependency and vulnerability relate to the 
factors of local and translocal connectivity and mobility. It also 
discusses how connectivity and mobility could be utilised to 
enhance self-reliance and strengthen the resilience of displaced 
people. The TRAFIG project investigates protracted displace-
ment situations from the conceptual perspective of transnational 
figurations of displacement to highlight the processual nature of 
social relations and networks.1  A figuration refers to social net-
works of interdependent human beings whose interactions and 
dependency relations significantly shape their lives. To focus 
on figurations makes it possible to dissect the dialectic relation 
between structure and agency—both the rigidity of systems and 
the capacities of individuals to change them. To depart from the 
concept of transnationalism enables us to stress social, cultural, 
economic and political flows and to highlight relations across 
the borders of nation-states (cf. Etzold et al., 2019).
Mobility	strategies
Our empirical evidence from interviews, focus group discus-
sions and participative observations confirm how Eritrean 
refugees resort to creative and highly diverse strategies to cope 
as much as possible with the insecurity and loss of livelihoods. 
To widen the opportunities to end their protracted and often 
very precarious situation, they use old networks and create new 
1 We define protracted displacement situations (PDS) as prolonged periods 
during which displaced persons cannot lead a life in permanent dignity in 
a secure place of choice as part of a durable solution. Protracted refugee 
situation (PRS) according to UNHCR’s widely used definition is one “in which 
25,000 or more refugees from the same nationality have been in exile for five 
years or more in a given asylum country” (UNHCR, 2015, p. 11). While this 
definition that is mainly used for monitoring purposes certainly has statistical 
and conceptual limitations, it is internationally recognised and thus carries 
legal-administrative weight. For analytical reasons it is nevertheless more 
expedient to speak of protracted displacement situations or dynamics that 
include any type of displacement (regardless of its legal or administrative 
recognition), smaller populations and a transnational focus.
connections across multiple spaces. These are based on past 
and present, personal and indirect relations. The connections 
include members of the community of origin, host communities 
and relations formed with other persons in transit. To test our 
hypothesis that mobility and connectivity are related to resil-
ience and self-reliance in situations of protracted displacement, 
this working paper examines the case of forced migration from 
Eritrea to Ethiopia. 
Eritrea has been in the top ten list of source countries for cross-
border displacements throughout the last decade. In 2019, over 
half a million refugees came from the six million population 
country (UNHCR, 2020, p. 20). With 12,500 per 100,000 inhab-
itants, Eritrea is the third-largest source of refugees worldwide 
after Syria and South Sudan in relative terms (UNHCR, 2020, 
p. 26). Due to decades of forced displacement, the Eritrean 
diaspora today can be found in North America, Europe, the 
Middle East and Australia.2  In the last ten years, 2011 to 2020, 
Eritreans were the fourth-largest group of migrants from third 
countries outside the European Union (after Syrians, Afghans 
and Iraqis) who were detected crossing the European Union’s 
external borders (FRONTEX data 2021). 
Migration	trajectories
Worsening living conditions related to numerous periods of 
armed conflicts and the currently reigning authoritarian regime 
(cf. Belloni, 2016, p. 3) have triggered most of Eritrean migra-
tion. Eritrea became an independent country after the Ethiopian 
Civil War that ended with the downfall of the military dictator 
Mengistu Haile Mariam in 1991. It has been ruled with an iron 
fist by President Isayas Afwerki since then. In the late 1990s, 
the relationship between the Eritrean People's Liberation Front 
(EPLF) and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) dete-
riorated. Up to 100,000 people died in the Ethiopian–Eritrean 
war from 1998 to 2000. Since then, Eritrea has experienced an 
even harsher militarisation and an indefinite extension of the 
obligatory military service for all citizens above 18. Peace was 
only agreed formally in 2018.  
2 Before independence, the number of refugees was even higher: “Eritrea 
has been a major refugee producing country since the 1960s … [when ]the 
country was torn by war to achieve independence. This conflict produced over 
a million refugees out of a population of 4 million” (Belloni, 2018, p. 7). The 
Eritrean diaspora has ever since been far reaching and rather well connected 
(Belloni, 2016; Black et al., 2000; Hirt, 2015; Treiber, 2017).
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For Eritreans seeking to leave the country, Ethiopia, Sudan, and 
Yemen are the primary destinations. Due to unstable situations 
in Yemen and Sudan, the relatively secure path to Ethiopia, 
established with the recent border opening, has become the pre-
ferred crossing option since 2018 (see Box 1 on p. 13). Data from 
December 2020 shows that, across Ethiopia, there are 178,315 
Eritrean refugees, which make up 22 per cent of the total 
796,437 refugee population in the country (Qalanjo, 2020). Out 
of these, 96,000 were sheltered mainly in four refugee camps: 
Shimelba (8,702), Mai Aini (21,682), Adi Harush (32,167) and 
Hitsats (25,248), which were established between 2004 and 
2013 (see Figure 1). 8,424 urban refugees benefit from the Ethio-
pian government’s out-of-camp programme in towns in Tigray. 
This demographic data might have changed following the recent 
conflict in Tigray. Media reports state that many refugees have 
had to leave the camps either due to a lack of provisions, being 
caught in cross-fire between the fighting forces, by intervening 
Eritrean forces across the border or by TPLF forces. Around 
54,000 Eritrean refugees live in the camps and settlements in 
Afar. Finally, around 28,000 live in the capital Addis Ababa as 
out-of-camp refugees (Qalanjo, 2020). 
Structure	of	the	paper
In Chapter 1, we start with the empirical design of the study, 
we will provide some background on the context of data col-
lection in the field and elaborate on limitations and challenges. 
Chapter 2 is about the genesis of protracted displacement in 
Ethiopia. Chapter 3 dissects the empirical data in line with the 
five main pillars of TRAFIG: Section 3.1 deals with govern-
ance regimes of aid and asylum, Section 3.2. ‘living in limbo’ 
deals with the everyday uncertainty connected to the refugee 
status and looks into the context of their livelihoods. Section 
3.3. investigates how refugees strategically use networks and 
connections to cope with mobility constraints connected to the 
refugee status, while Section 3.4 scrutinises how the displaced 
achieve local integration through alliances with the hosting 
communities. Section 3.5 presents in detail how the pitfalls of 
local integration like precarity, exploitation and tensions affect 
refugees and how their presence in turn impacts hosts and even 
provides new incentives for development. Chapter 4 examines 
cross-cutting issues relating to gender, vulnerability, ethnicity 
and analyses how the choice of options at the disposal of ref-
ugees relates to the type and range of networks they can draw 
from. The Conclusion summarises our findings and underlines 
the relevance of social and political factors that are not directly 
related to national and international refugee policy to the 
everyday life of refugees.
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The research team conducted field research in the Afar and 
Tigray region and in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia’s capital from 
October 2019 to end of September 2020. The team consisted 
of local and international researchers who used qualitative and 
quantitative research methods. This chapter provides an over-
view of the research context, sites, challenges, methods and the 
research team's composition.
1.1	Research	team	and	location
The Ethiopia research team consisted of two principal re-
searchers: Fekadu Adugna Tufa and Markus Rudolf as well as 
three senior researchers: Mulu Getachew, Desalegn Amsalu 
and Tekalign Ayalew. Benjamin Etzold supported the analysis 
of the survey findings. An additional nine assistants carried out 
surveys in Addis Ababa, Tigray (Mekelle, Shire, and Mai Aini) 
and Afar (Aysaita, Loggia, Berhale, Dalol, Bada). Trying our 
best to assure an unbiased and emic approach3  and establish 
an atmosphere of confidence and familiarity, these survey 
assistants were selected from among the refugee communities, 
except some hosts who worked in the humanitarian sector in 
Aysaita. A dozen of assistants were selected along criteria such 
as their language and organisational skills, familiarity with 
the field, networks, mobility and access (these criteria partly 
excluded women) and their estimated trustworthiness and 
objectivity in the respondents' eyes. 
The advantage of picking assistants from the target group was 
that they were part of the camp and out-of-camp life: It was 
easier for them to mobilise survey participants, they had 24-
hour access to the field, knew the language—and most impor-
tantly—were often able to triangulate information.  In Addis 
Ababa, where we conducted the survey amidst the COVID-19 
pandemic, involving the young refugees in conducting the 
survey was instrumental for its success. Another crucial ad-
vantage was that the assistants acted as points of reference for 
triangulation: Their experiences and observations were them-
selves important elements of the research, their comments and 
assessments fed back into the research process, and preliminary 
results were shaped by continuous discussion within the team.
3 By emic approach we mean an insider’s perspective. The core researchers 
can be categorised as ‘outsiders’ in terms of their experience of refugee life, 
though they have always tried to understand the insiders’ view, the assistants 
played an insiders’ role as they belong to the same category of refugee.
Eritrea borders two Ethiopian regions which, at the time of 
research, together hosted six official refugee camps. Four of 
them were in the Tigray region, two others in the Afar region in 
north-eastern Ethiopia. Most Eritrean refugees were found in 
the camps and in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa. In phase 
one, we started fieldwork in October 2019 in Addis Ababa 
among Eritrean refugees who are beneficiaries of the Ethiopian 
government’s out-of-camp policy (OCP). In Addis Ababa, our 
fieldwork focused on three localities: Gofa Mebrathayil, Haya-
hulet and Bole-Harabssa, neighbourhoods inhabited by many 
Eritrean refugees. In mid-November 2019, the team members 
started phase two in Tigray around the Ethiopia–Eritrea border. 
The team visited all refugee camps populated by Eritrean 
refugees4  and conducted over 70 semi-structured interviews, 
including various life histories, over a dozen expert interviews 
and six focus group discussions. 
The camps in Tigray and Afar region (see Figure 1) differed in 
size, population and facilities: 
•	 Shimelba camp was established in 2004. At the time of the 
research, most of the residents had spent more than fifteen 
years in the camp. The Kunama, a minority ethnic group in 
Eritrea who are less mobile and less connected, made up 70 
per cent of the population of Shimelba camp. They do not 
have a history of leaving their villages before the war. The 
camp’s population was considered stable (no or little sec-
ondary migration). The camp was closed in early February 
2021 as it was too close to the border and no longer safe 
(Gebre, 2021).
•	 Mai Aini and Adi Harush camps, founded in 2008 and 2010 
respectively, are situated in close proximity to each other and 
next to Mai Tsabri town. They are well-established camps 
populated mainly by Tigrinya5  who are mobile and well 
connected. The camp population is dynamic, and individuals 
stay from several days up to ten years.  
 
 
4 This research would not have taken this shape without the research permit 
and official support we secured from the Agency for Refugee and Returnees 
Affairs (ARRA). We are extremely grateful to ARRA and ARRA officials from 
head office to refugee camps.
5 Though the terminology might be confusing, this paper follows the local 
categorisation: While Tigrinya speakers comprise both Ethiopians and 
Eritreans, Ethiopians refer to themselves as Tigrayans (people living in Tigray 
and speaking Tigrinya), while Eritreans are called Tigrinya. The downside of 
this categorisation is that one term carries two meanings: Tigrinya (speakers) 
and Tigrinya (group from Eritrea). The upside of this blatant imprecision is that 
it reflects the general arbitrariness connected to the term. As the precise line 
of division remains mostly unclear in the practical use of the term, the authors 
preferred to not opt for an artificially precise distinction. Whenever required, 
the text will use Ethiopian or Eritrean for clarification.
1.	Empirical	design	and	limitations	of	the	study		
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munity members) at each site but focussed on displaced people 
who are (potentially) experiencing protracted displacement. 
Almost 90 per cent of our respondents were Eritrean refugees; 
60 per cent of the respondents were male. The share of re-
spondents living in camps was roughly the same as those living 
outside of camps (see figure on p. 8). At different sites, we also 
spoke to members of the local communities affected by pro-
tracted displacement, network contacts of refugees and to key 
stakeholders7  using semi-structured and biographic interviews. 
Criteria for the selection of respondents in specific locations 
included sex, age, family status, educational background (as 
an indicator of socio-economic status/class), nationality and 
(where appropriate) ethnicity, legal status at current place of 
residence, religion, access to support by governments, human-
itarian organisations, and finally the factor of translocal and/or 
transnational connections. It needs mentioning that we—due 
to a lack of access—had to leave out some of the often most 
vulnerable individuals, namely those who had been left behind 
in Eritrea.
When conducting research on and with refugees, certain meth-
odological issues arise that are related to fears and expectations 
by the refugees. We, therefore, resorted to trust-building, 
low profile snowball sampling and tried to counter the inbuilt 
inaccuracies of sampling methods that deal with groups that 
include hidden populations (Jacobsen, 2006, p. 284), such as 
unregistered displaced Eritreans in Ethiopia, by using a variety 
of access points. We defined locations and target groups in a 
continuous dialogue with the team and local experts. After 
having identified different points of entry in this way, we picked 
individual respondents as randomly as possible from each 
segment. In addition to this classically structured approach, we 
included a systematic serendipity routine to collect and process 
information outside the box.8  Our research, thus, provides 
representative ideal typical cases without claiming statistical 
representativeness. 
7 We reached key stakeholders through 34 expert interviews with practition-
ers at the top level to local staff on the ground, from intergovernmental 
organisations, governmental institutions, international and national NGOs, 
to community-based organisations and from consultants and academics to 
policymakers.
8 To systematically include serendipity into our research methods meant 
to allow for coincidences not only to happen but to routinely follow the 
opportunities opened by them. In contrast to traditional sample methods, 
which requires the utmost rigidity in adhering to the randomly chosen site, 
this method allowed us talk to e.g. neighbours if nobody was present at a 
randomly chosen house. Systematic serendipity as a method, thus, provided 
additional details about the absent persons and their relations to the host. 
The idea behind this methodology is to follow the people—but also to allow 
for people to follow us. When a shepherd passed by, we asked him about live-
stock activities; when we encountered people washing their clothes we asked 
about sanitation, sewage, or we enquired about the property right of the land 
to dry clothes or the gender / age division of such work. In sum, serendipity 
was not evaded as usual but systematically sought after. (Rudolf, 2019b).
Hitsats camp, established in 2013 and closed in early Feb-
ruary 2021 after reports of attacks,6  was mainly populated 
by newcomers at the time of research. Many refugees who 
arrived following the brief border opening in 2018 and 
settled in Hitsats were women, children and older people 
who used the opportunity to leave Eritrea. That changed the 
camp's demographic characteristics from young, single and 
male to mixed-age, sex and marital status. 
•	 Aysaita and Berhale are two camps in close proximity to the 
towns of the same name. They are mostly inhabited by Afar 
who remain in the camps once they get there. The duration 
of stay ranges from a few months to years with little dynamic 
within the camp population. Nevertheless, the camps are 
working at full capacity and cannot officially accommodate 
new refugees—unless someone leaves. A large number of 
refugees lives with local hosting populations and regularly 
travels to the camps to receive their rations. There are var-
ious contacts, cooperations and interactions with the local 
population.
1.2	Sampling	and	data	collection
Taking the qualitative mixed-methods approach developed for 
the TRAFIG project, the team conducted 44 in-depth narrative 
interviews, 113 semi-structured interviews and 395 survey 
interviews, as well as 21 focus group discussions at 20 study 
sites. The sites were quite diverse, ranging from refugee camps 
in rural areas to small towns and the urban periphery to larger 
cities. At each site, participant observations, transect walks and 
mobile methods complemented our research: We observed life 
in- and outside camps, participated in daily activities, visited 
homes, ate local food, went to working places and travelled 
with—or waited for—local transport. 
More than 700 persons participated in our research. In line with 
the TRAFIG methods handbook, we tried to reach three major 
sub-groups (displaced persons, network contacts and local com-
6 See Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/article/instant-article/idUSKBN2AC0NG.
Figure	1:	Refugee	camps	in	Eritrea
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1.3	Fieldwork	challenges
The need to follow official, hierarchical procedures consumed a 
significant amount of all team members' time and energy. Refu-
gee-related matters are almost completely top-down rather than 
bottom-up processes. Nevertheless, officials, members of the 
hosting communities and refugees were exceptionally helpful 
in identifying potential respondents. 
One challenge we faced was the refugee respondents' suspi-
cion and expectations. Eritrean refugees regard the situation 
in their country of origin as continuously hazardous—they are 
also unsettled about the consequences of the ongoing peace 
talks between Ethiopian and Eritrea for their status. Together 
with concerns related to ongoing resettlement processes, these 
circumstances limited their readiness to talk and the extent of 
information they were willing to share. The collection of quanti-
tative data was often less problematic than qualitative inter-
views because it is less personal. In qualitative interviews, the 
risks attached to openness are much higher for the respondents. 
The team ensured that it clearly communicated objectives, con-
ditions, and risks and that everyone’s anonymity was respected. 
The research was carried out as unbiased as possible, avoiding 
(re-)traumatising, discriminating, endangering or exposing 
respondents in any way. 
We did our research from October 2019 to September 2020. 
Everywhere but in Addis, we had completed our research before 
the Ethiopian government imposed COVID-19 restrictions and 
before an armed conflict started in the Tigray region on  
4 November 2020. As to descriptions that refer to the situation 
in Tigray, the reader has to bear in mind recent changes (de-
scribed in Box 1) and the fact that it was not possible to confirm 
any details about the situation in Tigray at the time of writing. 
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2.2	 International	refuge
Ethiopia is also setting records when it comes to hosting refu-
gees.10  It is the second major refugee-hosting country in Africa, 
next to Uganda. By 31 October 2020, the country sheltered 
796,440 registered refugees and asylum seekers (UNHCR, 
2020a). The refugees live in 26 camps mainly located in Gam-
bella, Benishangul Gumuz, Somali, Afar and Tigray as well as 
urban centres (mainly Addis Ababa). Refugees from Somalia 
are hosted mainly in the Somali region of Ethiopia; refugees 
from South Sudan and Sudan are hosted in refugee camps in 
Gambella and Benishangul Gumuz, and refugees from Eritrea 
(the focus group of our research) are hosted in Tigray and Afar 
regions. 
As Table 1 below shows, the overwhelming majority of the 
refugees originate from South Sudan where they have fled from 
a protracted civil war. A large number of refugees come from 
Somalia and Eritrea. Others originate from Sudan, Yemen 
and the Great Lakes Region, such as the Democratic Republic 
of the Congo. We focused on Eritrean refugees and their long 
history of displacement, their local and global connectivity and 
their trans-local and international mobility that would help us 
examine our research question: The role of connectivity and 
mobility in mitigating protracted displacement situations. 
10 Even though the line between IDPs, (irregular) migrants and refugees is in 
many cases merely administrative, their legal, political, and social situation 
differs greatly. We use displaced persons to refer to all three categories – and 
refugees when referring to a legal status. Refugee in this sense, is an individ-
ual that according to international conventions is granted a special political 
status. According to the refugee conventions it is a person that, "owing to a 
well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationali-
ty, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the 
country of his nationality, and is unable to, or owing to such fear, is unwilling 
to avail himself of the protection of that country" (United Nations, 1951. 
Refugee Convention).
Displacement in Ethiopia has two contrasting sides: On the one 
hand, the country has a record number of internally displaced 
persons (IDPs) and, on the other, it has been hosting one of the 
largest refugee populations, whose situation can be considered 
as protracted (see footnote 1 above).9  Our focus is on Eritrean 
refugees inside Ethiopia. Policy and the daily experiences of 
specific refugee groups are embedded into and affected by his-
torical and current issues of internal displacement, of Ethiopian 
refugees abroad, and of refugees from other nations. Rules and 
regulations are, for example, different for persons displaced 
from Eritrea or South Sudan, which is, in turn, often related to 
the dynamic of external relations with those countries.
2.1	 Internal	displacement
Ethiopia has had IDPs since the 1980s, both due to ethnic conflict 
and natural disasters. From 2014 to 2018, young Ethiopians, in 
particular, staged a series of protests against the government, 
which had been in power since 1991. The protests were precipi-
tated by unemployment, inequality, corruption, and human rights 
abuse, particularly following the 2005 general election (Tefera, 
2019; McCracken, 2004; IDMC, 2009). The protests led to the 
coming to power of Abiy Ahmed in April 2018, who promised 
political reform. Immediately after the change of government, 
a series of inter-ethnic conflicts again led to the internal dis-
placement of people. Nearly three million people were internally 
displaced in 2018 due to conflicts and violence. The figure was the 
biggest global record for the year (IDMC, 2019, p. 6). The problem 
also extended into 2019, when mid-year figures showed that there 
were 522,000 new conflict- and violence-induced displacements, 
the third-highest figure globally (IDMC, 2020). 
Despite several positive political developments in 2018, old 
conflicts became more entrenched, and new conflicts escalated 
along various state borders in 2019. In the first half of 2020, 
there were 68,000 new internal displacements associated with 
conflict and violence and 301,000 with disasters (IDMC, 2020). 
Even if displacement trends were reversing in 2020 compared 
to previous years, Ethiopia was still facing a significant number 
of IDPs. Internal displacements are not only symptomatic of the 
internal political context but are also relevant for host–refugee 
relations: Some members of the hosting population we en-
countered were IDPs and sometimes more vulnerable than the 
refugees themselves. 
9 In the Ethiopian context, there is no specific definition of protracted displace-
ment. Only one of the nine pledges the Ethiopian government made to support 
refugees states: “To allow for local integration of protracted refugees who have 
lived in Ethiopia for 20 years or more”. This is just a cutting point for the pledge 
around local integration rather than a definition of protracted displacement.
2.	Protracted	displacement	in	Ethiopia
Country of origin Number %







Source: https://data2.unhcr.org/en/country/eth, accessed 4 December 2020
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In most cases, refugees and respective host communities share 
a similar language, cultural practices and religion. A sizeable 
group of refugees and asylum seekers live out-of-camp, of 
whom 33,000 have registered as urban refugees in the capital 
Addis Ababa (UNHCR, 2020). Refugees are allowed to live in 
the urban centres on two grounds: Some benefit from the out-
of-camp policy (OCP), some qualify for the urban assistance 
programme (UAP). The OCP started in 2010 and has only been 
used for Eritrean refugees. Eritrean refugees enjoy historical, 
linguistic, religious and ethnic commonalities with main-
stream highland Ethiopian cultures. Due to their demographic 
characteristics (until 2018)—most of them young, male and 
single—they are supposed to be self-reliant. However, to benefit 
from the OCP, Eritrean refugees have to a) produce evidence 
that they have some income to live on without engaging in any 
income-generating activity; and b) present an Ethiopian citizen 
who serves as their guarantor. The UAP is a programme for all 
refugee groups based on their specific vulnerabilities, such as 
health and special protection needs that cannot be met in camps. 
Thus, while the OCP refugees do not receive any support as 
they are expected to be self-reliant, the UAP refugees receive 
financial assistance from UNHCR (Betts et al., 2019). 
While Ethiopia not only receives one of the highest numbers 
of refugees, it also generates one of the highest numbers of 
refugees on the African continent. The Ethiopian Socialist 
revolution that overthrew the Imperial regime of Emperor Haile 
Selassie I (r. 1930–74) in 1974 and the Ethiopia–Somalia war 
(1977–78) caused the influx of Ethiopian refugees in Somalia, 
Djibouti, and Sudan. In 1977, Ethiopia's refugee population in 
the neighbouring countries was 200,000, but by the end of 1978, 
this number grew to 400,000. Most came from the northern part 
of Ethiopia that includes today’s Tigray region and present-day 
Eritrea. In 1984, a famine forced 300,000 people, mostly from 
northern Ethiopia, to flee to neighbouring countries (Kraler et 
al., 2020, p. 17). The Tigray conflict that started on 3 November 
2020 set off a new wave of Ethiopian refugees seeking asylum 
mainly in Sudan. The number of Ethiopians seeking refuge in 
eastern Sudan had reached 46,412 on 2 December 2020, one 
month into the conflict (UNHCR, 2020b). This event also led 
to massive internal displacement (see Box 1 "Current armed 
conflict in Tigray" on p. 13).
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Ethiopia was one of the 17 refugee-hosting states that endorsed 
the New York Declaration arising from the New York Summit. 
Following that, Ethiopia co-hosted a high-level meeting on ref-
ugees in New York on 20 September 2016, where it committed 
to delivering on nine sets of pledges11  that anticipated to sub-
stantially expand the protection, socio-economic services, and 
opportunities provided to refugees living within its jurisdiction 
(ARRA, 2017; Nigusie & Carver, 2019). 
A year later, in 2017, the Ethiopian government launched its 
roadmap (see ARRA, 2017) to implement the pledges and the 
application of the CRRF and established a steering committee. 
The pledges were organised into six thematic areas: Out-of-
Camp, Education, Work and Livelihoods, Documentation, 
Other Social and Basic Services and Local Integration. The 
Roadmap outlined the bureaucratic structures that would 
oversee implementation, emphasising a whole-of-government 
approach (Nigusie & Carver, 2019, p. 7) to deliver through joint 
ownership by the Administration for Refugees and Returnees 
Affairs (ARRA) and the Ministry of Finance. In February 2017, 
the Ethiopian government agreed on being among the first 
countries to implement the CRRF. By mid-2018, a new Refugee 
Proclamation had been drafted with the support of UNHCR 
and key donors. The new Refugee Proclamation was ulti-
mately adopted by parliament in January 2019 (Proclamation 
1110/2019). 
The new refugee proclamation is acclaimed for being one of 
Africa's most progressive refugee laws (UNHCR, 2020). Like 
in its predecessor (Proclamation 409/2004), Ethiopia maintains 
an open-door policy for refugee inflows and allows humani-
tarian access and protection to those seeking asylum. Moreover, 
the new proclamation made progressive changes. According to 
Article 26, Sub-articles 1-10 of Proclamation 1110/2019, refu-
gees can enjoy employment and property rights that will help 
them to become self-reliant. They have the right to employ-
ment in agriculture, industry and small and micro-enterprises 
such as handicrafts. The new job compact in the proclamation 
provides refugees with the right to engage in paid employment, 
11 The nine pledges are: (1) Expansion of the out-of-camp policy (OCP) to ten per 
cent of the refugee population, (2) Increase of education enrolment among 
refugees, (3) Provision of work permits to refugees with permanent residence, 
(4) Provision of work permits to graduate refugees in areas permitted for 
foreign workers, (5) Making irrigable land available to 100,000 people for  
crop production, both refugees and hosts (6) Developing industrial parks, with 
30 per cent of jobs for refugees, (7) Making more documentation available to 
refugees, (8) Enhance the provision of basic and social services, (9) Making 
local integration available to refugees who have been in Ethiopia for more 
than 20 years. (The December 2017 Roadmap translated these into six thematic 
areas, with pledges 3-6 grouped under Work and Livelihoods.)
In the following, we dissect the empirical data in line with the five 
main pillars of TRAFIG’s research: Governance regimes of aid 
and asylum, everyday uncertainty connected to refugee status and 
livelihoods, translocal network connections and mobility, alliances 
with the hosting communities and development potentials that 
(might) emerge out of displacement.
3.1	Navigating	through	governance	regimes	
of	aid	and	asylum
The following section introduces governmental policies  
and their impact—both positively and negatively—on peoples’ 
opportunities to overcome their situation of protracted  
displacement.
Official Ethiopian policy framework
Proclamation No. 409/2004 is the first statutory asylum and 
refugee law of Ethiopia. Before this proclamation, Ethiopia had 
neither concrete national policies nor proclamations to regu-
late situations of asylum seekers and refugees. Proclamation 
No. 409/2004 was enacted based on international and regional 
refugee conventions. It included provisions of the 1951 Con-
vention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1969 OAU Refugee 
Convention. However, the 2004 proclamation is criticised for 
not spelling out refugees' rights and entitlements in a substan-
tive framework that informs and facilitates their understanding 
and enforcement in specific national settings. Moreover, the 
proclamation restricted the rights to movement and work. It 
assumed that refugees would return to their countries of origin 
and were to be supported in camps until their return.
Ethiopia’s legal regime on refugees and asylum seekers changed 
with the global changes in the refugee and migration frame-
works. On 19 September 2016, the United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA) unanimously adopted the New York Decla-
ration for Refugees and Migrants, reaffirming the importance 
of international refugee rights and committing to strengthen 
protection and support for people on the move (UNGA, 2016). 
Based on the request of the UN General Assembly, UNHCR 
initiated and developed a Comprehensive Refugee Response 
Framework (CRRF) that featured large-scale movements of 
refugees and protracted refugee situations with four key objec-
tives: (a) ease pressure on host countries, (b) enhance refugee 
self-reliance, (c) expand access to third-country solutions, and 
(d) support conditions in countries of origin for return in safety 
and dignity. Subsequently, in December 2018, UNGA affirmed 
a non-binding Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) which 
incorporates the CRRF and a plan of action (UNGA, 2018). 
3.	Key	dimensions	of	figurations	of	displacement	in	Ethiopia	and	beyond
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The number of Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia has steadily grown 
over the last 15 years from just over 10,000 persons in 2005 to 
an estimated 177,000 persons in 2020 (see Figure 2). However, 
the respective numbers of Eritreans fleeing to Ethiopia from 
their regions of origin has changed. Our survey indicates that 
most Eritrean Afars fled to the country six to twelve years ago, 
whereas more Tigriynas arrived in recent years. 
The 2018 peace deal and the loosened border controls are a dou-
ble-edged sword for the Eritrean refugees. The negative side is 
that, in January 2020, the Ethiopian government switched from 
recognising Eritrean refugees prima facie to a case by case 
approach (Eint-BICC-MR--001-ETH). Following the recent 
conflict (Box 1) and the defeat of the ruling party in Tigray, 
the Ethiopian government confirmed in December 2020 that 
Hitsats and Shimelba camps will be closed down, and refugees 
will be moved to Adi-Harush and Mai Aini camps . On the 
positive side, ARRA reduced the security screening time for 
OCP candidates from 45 to 1 to 7 days, and refugees are no 
longer required to provide a guarantor to live outside a camp. 
Papers for OCP status (practically an equivalent to a residence 
permit in the cities) are to be handed out swiftly once individ-
uals waive aid claims. In March 2020 when we were in the field, 
a functioning procedure for working permits was scheduled to 
be in place by July 2020, the implementation might have been 
delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 
such as in agriculture, industrial parks, small and micro-scale 
enterprises, handicrafts, and commerce. The proclamation 
also gives refugees and asylum seekers the right to a residence 
permit once the refugee has been selected for employment, 
subject to renewal every five years. They also have the right to 
open bank accounts, legally register births and marriages and 
attend primary school. Last but not least, the new proclamation 
has unambiguously outlined a comprehensive set of ‘rights and 
obligations’—mostly along the lines provided under interna-
tional instruments.  
Governing	the	influx	of	Eritrean	refugees
Five years after Eritrea’s independence in 1993, the 1998–2000 
bloody Eritrean–Ethiopian war began, and so did the influx of 
Eritrean refugees. Between 1998 and 2018, the border between 
the two countries was closed and extremely militarised. The 
Ethiopian government set up a system to receive Eritreans 
who managed to cross the border through 17 entry points and 
took them to three collection centres near the border (Adi 
Nebrid, Adwa and Fatsi). From there, they were transported to 
a screening centre at Inda Abbaguna, 17 km from Shire town. 
Until January 2020, Eritrean asylum seekers were accepted 
on prima facie bases and were all assigned to one of the six 
refugee camps, where they were screened and registered within 
a few days. Their allocation was mainly based on ethnicity: 
Two camps in Afar regional state are populated by the Afar; 
Shimelba camp in Tigray is dominated by the Kunama, and the 
remaining three camps (Mai Aini, Adi Harush and Hitsats) are 
mainly inhabited by the Tigriyna.
Figure	2:	Number	of	registered	Eritrean	refugees	in	Ethiopia	and	survey	respondents'	year	of	departure	from	Eritrea	(according	
to	region	of	origin)
Source:  UNHCR online database, accessed 20 February 2021, and TRAFIG survey data (n=395) 
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According to key informants from UNHCR and ARRA, the 
Ethiopian government is not to blame for unfulfilled promises. 
One informant stated: 
If you look at the CRRF, many provisions are stipulated 
requiring international collaboration. The ambitious 
work pledges are meant to be realised by the support of 
international donors. However, due to the existing inter-
national crisis in global refugees and COVID-19, there 
are no programmes and projects funded by the interna-
tional community to support the refugees formally get 
works. Programmes on Eritrean refugees are especially 
almost zero. If at all, some interest is shown for South 
Sudanese and Somali refugees. Since most of the Eritrean 
refugees are in the young age group, some partners focus 
on skills training instead of job creation. If you ask, many 
Eritrean refugees will show you training certificates in 
three or more skills. However, there is no formal employ-
ment opportunity (EInt-AAU-DA-024-ETH).
From policy to practice
In the second half of 2019, some of the promises in the new 
proclamation were fulfilled. While refugees can register births 
and marriages, open bank accounts and buy SIM cards, the 
right to work, residence permits, local integration and dimin-
ishing encampment remain only on paper. Refugees still have 
to find means to get jobs in the informal sector. Several scholars 
have expressed their concern about the practicability of the 
highly ambitious proclamation regarding employment (Betts 
et al., 2019; Fekadu & Deshinghar, 2019; Mehari, 2019). Critics 
were sceptical if a country strained by unemployment with 19 
per cent of urban youth unemployment in 2018 (CSA, 2019) 
could provide jobs for that many refugees. Besides, no regula-
tion has been enacted on the implementation of the proclama-
tion’s provisions. According to Art. 46 Sub-article 1 of the new 
proclamation, the Council of Ministers may issue regulations 
for its proper implementation, and Sub-article 2 tasks ARRA 
with issuing directives for the regulations’ implementation. 
According to a key informant from ARRA, some progress 
has been made in enacting the directives, yet no regulations 
had been issued by the end of 2020 (Eint-Bicc-MR-001-ETH). 
The peace deal of 2018 between the Eritrean President Isayas Afwerki and his Ethiopian counterpart Abiy Ahmed and the subse-
quent brief opening of the border helped to highlight commonalities between both nations. It also allowed for dynamic interaction 
among refugees, receiving and origin communities. The new arrival of thousands of Eritrean refugees undeniably created new 
tensions between hosts and refugees regarding housing and access to basic services. Ethiopia’s commitment to the Global Compact 
for Refugees/ CRRF led to revised laws and policies, and the accelerating implementation of these reforms on the ground gave hope 
that viable solutions would be found.
However, since war broke out in November 2020, Eritrean refugees have found themselves at the centre of the conflict. All the camps 
in Tigray are located in the area of conflict. There were reports that Hitsats and Shimelba camps were partially destroyed, and refu-
gees were forced to leave. The media report about the disappearance of thousands of refugees, and, at the time of writing, UNHCR is 
trying to establish the whereabouts of several thousand Eritreans. Contradictory accounts state that they were trafficked back across 
the border or abducted by the TPLF. Yet ARRA declared that it has traced their whereabouts, most of them were dispersed in other 
camps, towns and cities in Amhara region and Addis Ababa.1  According to ARRA, some refugees returned to Eritrea of their own vo-
lition because of the conflict and the interruption of provisions at the camps. Another open question remains whether Eritrean forces 
participated in the conflict against the TPLF and whether the refugees have been exposed to forces they sought to escape. While the 
Ethiopian and Eritrean governments denied the Eritrean army’s participation, the TPLF and some global actors claim otherwise. 
The unlimited military service in Eritrea, justified mainly by the very conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, caused many Eritreans 
to flee. Eritrea considers them deserters. From this viewpoint, the opening of the border resulting from the rapprochement between 
their country of origin and the host country in 2018 is fraught with risks for the refugees. 
After having cooperated closely in the civil war against the authoritarian Marxist regime known as the Derg on both sides of the 
current border before Eritrea's independence, the growing estrangement of their leaders led to an international war in 1998 and a 
military stalemate that lasted until 2018. When the TPLF lost its hold over Addis Ababa and Abiy Ahmed came to power, he finally 
brokered a peace deal between both nations for which he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. The Tigray nevertheless maintained 
their opposition to their northern neighbour. This opposition also affected Eritrean Tigrinya refugees. In 2020, questions of camp 
management had become highly politicised, and the refugees became a bargaining chip in the dispute between the central and the 
regional government. ARRA, as a central government institution, encountered increasing difficulties in cooperating with Tigrayan 
authorities. The TPLF has furthermore been supporting oppositional Eritreans in Tigray up to today. Eritrea, in turn, is now coop-
erating with the Ethiopian Army, at least by offering them opportunities for retreat and logistical support. 
1 See https://ethiopianmonitor.com/2021/02/11/agency-says-eritrean-refugees-returning-to-camps/
Box	1:	Effects	of	armed	conflict	in	Tigray
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Concluding	remarks
In this chapter, we presented the Ethiopian refugee governance 
framework. Recent refugee-related regulations such as the out-
of-camp policy (OCP) and the revised 2019 proclamation are 
relevant to the everyday lives of the refugees. Many thousands 
of Eritrean refugees have followed the OCP and benefitted from 
entitlements to open bank accounts, access telecommunications 
and obtain ID cards. OCP has also helped refugees navigate 
through certain remaining constraints: So far, refugees do not 
have work permits, as the crucial provision of the 2019 revised 
proclamation has not yet been implemented. In this situation, 
the OCP is a means to get access to towns and cities where ref-
ugees find more opportunities like accessing businesses/labour 
positions informally. 
However, the pace of implementation of the remaining provi-
sions in the 2019 proclamation is slow. The international com-
munity has also failed to live up to its promises of increasing 
funds and resettlement opportunities, which only delays the 
implementation of the proclamation even further.     
Besides ARRA and UNHCR, a few international partner 
NGOs support urban refugees and those in camps. In the cities, 
several NGOs are working on education, health and livelihood 
support. Some NGOs support refugees who are proven to have 
chronic diseases such as diabetes, kidney problems, hyperten-
sion, or any physical disability (monthly allowance of cash of 
around 2,100 birr (US $53) per month) in coordination with 
ARRA/UNHCR. Family members of those eligible for medical 
allowance also get free medical care and financial support to 
cover school fees and educational materials. Vulnerable urban 
refugees frequently mentioned Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS). It 
provides them with food, such as five kilos of rice and one litre 
of oil a month to the most vulnerable and better assistance to 
refugees with chronic health problems. In general, the provi-
sion of support to urban refugees lags far behind. According 
to our survey, three of four Eritrean refugees living outside of 
camps did not receive any support within the last year from the 
government, international organisations or local NGOs. This is 
partly because most urban refugees are OCP beneficiaries who 
have forfeited their right to aid.
Refugees also complain about the ineffectiveness and possible 
corruption of international organisations, mainly UNHCR. A 
refugee in Adi Harush camp criticised: "We see UNHCR in the 
camp only through its flag. It is not doing anything, especially 
regarding resettlement"(Sint-AAU-MG—010-ETH). Tekeste 
in Addis Ababa’s Gofa Mebrathayil commented: “UNHCR is a 
smokeless factory”, referring to widespread corruption in the 
agency (Sint-AAU-FA-001-ETH). Nearly every refugee has 
something negative to say about corruption in UNHCR. Like 
Jemal in Adi Harush camp:
UNHCR is a bogus father who enjoys food and beer while 
his kids are starving at home. The corruption and abuses 
at UNHCR are really disgusting (Sint-AAU-FA-010-ETH). 
The major corruption allegation by the refugees is a scheme 
where resettlement opportunities are given to Ethiopian citizens 
who are passed off as Eritreans because they speak the same 
language as the refugees—either through bribing or nepotism. 
However, our research could not confirm the validity of this 
allegation. Actually, in our discussion with the actors in refugee 
administration and humanitarian aid, they stress that many of 
these allegations are caused by widespread misinformation or 
the misconception that refugees have concerning the agencies’ 
role, competences and mandates. According to some camp 
officials, the receiving countries and not ARRA or UNHCR 
determine the resettlement opportunities (EInt-AAU-FA-
002-ETH). They also stress that international support and funds 
have declined following multiple global conflicts like the Syrian 
or the Yemen crises and the COVID-19 pandemic (EInt-AAU-
DA-024-ETH). 
Key findings
•	 The implementation of crucial elements of a refugee 
policy reform such as official work and business permits 
is still pending.
•	 The factual easing of restrictions has facilitated numerous 
improvements for refugees' livelihoods. 
•	 The recent changes of the existing policies have bene-
fitted refugees with connections to resourceful networks 
more than those with less connections. 
TRAFIG working paper no. 5  •  03/2021  •  15TRAFIG working paper no. 5  •  03/2021  •  14
3.2	Living	in	limbo:	Livelihoods,	(in)security	
and	precarity	in	local	settings	
This section discusses the everyday lives of Eritrean refugees in 
protracted displacement situations. Many thousands of Eritrean 
refugees are ‘stuck’ in six refugee camps and in several small 
and big cities, where they experience intractable phases of 
waiting and immobility. The first aspect of limbo is the state of 
waiting for an uncertain and indefinite period of time without a 
durable solution. The second is the impact of this waiting on the 
livelihoods of refugees in camps and in urban centres.
Intractable waiting
Displacement becomes protracted if no solution to one’s 
individual situation is in sight and if options that provide a 
pathway towards a better future, such as sustainable liveli-
hoods, permanent residency, resettlement or onward mobility, 
remain blocked. The persons we interviewed in our survey were 
displaced for 5.5 years on average—statistically, their situation 
could thus be classified as a protracted refugee situation. The 
times they had to endure in displacement differed significantly 
between the study sites (see Figure 3). The results clearly show 
that encampment contributes to protracting a displacement 
situation, and the longer one stays, the less likely it seems that 
one will find a way out (see Figure 4). Our survey results reveal 
that those who left the camp through the OCP, which started 
in 2010, also have the opportunity to resettle through different 
means: family reunification UNHCR, secondary irregular 
migration or resettlement through UNHCR.
Eritrean Afar who live in Aysaita camp have been in exile for 
eight years on average, whereas those in Mai Aini camp just 
under five years. Urban refugees benefitting from the OCP not 
only enjoyed more diverse livelihood options but have also been 
in Ethiopia for a shorter period. Eritrean refugees have tradi-
tionally settled in Gofa Mebrathayil and Bole-Harabssa, both 
neighbourhoods of Addis Ababa. The fact that the refugees stay 
an average of five years in Bole-Harabssa and only three years 
in Gofa Mebrathayil indicates that refugees who are better 
connected and have better financial resources live there and 
leave earlier, while those refugees whose connections have only 
limited financial means to assist them prefer the peri-urban 
Bole-Harabssa where renting a house is relatively cheaper.
Refugees, particularly those who have stayed in the camps 
for a prolonged time, are worried about having to wait indefi-
nitely. Our informant from Shimelba camp, who has been there 
since its establishment in 2004, reported: “We feel like we are 
blocked from all opportunities” (Eint-AAU-FA-012-ETH). 
Most of the Kunama refugees in Shimelba have, for example, 
spent 20 years in camps waiting for the day that they can leave 
(no quantitative data was collected in Shimelba). They arrived 
in 2000 and spent four years in a ‘temporary camp’ under the 
Ethiopian government's protection and support before moving 
to Shimelba. Tadde, a participant in a focus group discussion, 
who was among the early arrivals, stated: 
Spending 20 years at a place without a job is simply 
devastating (…). Many people here have developed mental 
problems. When you talk to them, they may look [like they 
are] listening to you, but, they cannot hear you. They 
move around, but they have become insensitive to their 
environment (Eint-AAU-FA-012-ETH). 
The absence of a durable solution, and limited prospects for the 
future have left many on the brink of despair and hopelessness. 
Frank, who was, like Tadde, a Refugee Central Committee 
member, said: “If human beings cannot change themselves 
through education, if they cannot improve themselves by 
working, they are valueless.” (Eint-AAU-FA-012-ETH). 
Figure	3:	Eritrean	refugees’	time	in	displacement	according	
to	study	site
Source: TRAFIG survey data (n=395)
Source: TRAFIG survey data (n=395)
Figure	4:	Time	in	displacement	of	Eritrean	refugees	living	
in-	and	outside	of	camps
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Being stuck in ‘waiting time’ triggers desperation, and many 
start drinking alcohol to pass the time. In Adi Harush, several 
youth were already drunk at 10 a.m. In Addis Ababa, a neigh-
bour in Gofa Mebrathayil complained that young Eritrean 
refugees shout and disturb the area at night as they are drunk. 
The persons of concern are young and unmarried. They left 
their parents at a young age to join the military. After ending 
up in refugee camps, they are now waiting indefinitely to be al-
lowed to realise their aspirations: Getting employed, building a 
house, buying a plot for the family, starting a family, pursuing a 
higher degree and enabling their future children to do so. Some 
of them have been waiting for work permits. Still, some are 
waiting to return to Eritrea should the political condition they 
ran away from change. Many of them are waiting to resettle in 
a third country. In the worst scenario, the desperation caused by 
indefinite waiting affects their mental health like in Jemal’s case: 
(see Box 2)
For most Eritrean refugees in camps in northern Ethiopia, such 
feelings of being in limbo even started before they arrived in 
the refugee camps. Most of them were conscripted by force to 
the Eritrean military indefinitely. They had been waiting for 
the day they would be freed from the military service—called 
Sawa—until they finally ran away to refugee camps or to cities 
where they continue to wait for a durable solution. Tekeste is a 
30-year-old man we interviewed in Addis Ababa in November 
2019. He joined the army just as he completed grade eleven. In 
Eritrea, it is mandatory to join the military training camp upon 
completing grade eleven and attend grade twelve, the final year 
of high school, at the camp side by side with military training. 
When he tried to run away, he was caught and spent five years 
in prison. He finally managed to escape from prison in 2012 and 
arrived in Ethiopia. After a relatively short time in Adi Harush 
camp, he arrived in Addis Ababa in 2013 where he was eligible 
for the urban assistance programme for medical reasons. He 
considered that more than one-third of his life had been unpro-
ductive, a time he had been waiting to transit to a ‘productive 
life.’12  He said: "I wasted thirteen years of my life, and I do not 
know what will happen next. I am just waiting and waiting” 
(Sint-AAU-FA-001-ETH).
12 The feeling of doing nothing productive is typical for many protracted dis-
placement situations (PDS). This includes children from early age on (Mann, 
2008).
Jemal was a member of the Eritrean army, like most of our 
interviewees. He arrived in 2007 and lived in the Shimelba 
camp. After spending over six years in camps, in 2013, 
when most of the refugees—including his friends—left 
through Libya, he developed mental health problems and 
was admitted to Amanuel hospital, a psychiatric hospital in 
Addis Ababa. He comes from a poor family. He has a sister 
in Saudi Arabia who lives from hand to mouth. He spent over 
two years in hospital and returned to Adi Harush when his 
situation improved in 2015. In 2019, he developed tubercu-
losis. We interviewed him shortly after his recovery. For 
Jemal, who had lost hope on resettlement and cannot return 
to Eritrea until the current Eritrean regime is in power, 
local integration is the only way out of protracted displace-
ment. Jemal worked as a plumber and painter before he was 
forced to join the Eritrean military in 1998. Now he is eager 
to see the revised proclamation implemented so that he can 
leave the camp to be self-reliant and work as a plumber in 
one of the towns (Bint-AAU-FA-016-ETH).
Box	3:	Amiche—Being	on	the	fence
Some Eritrean refugees are nicknamed Amiche (after an 
old Italian company that used to assemble vehicles in Addis 
Ababa). Amiche is a hybrid identity. They are persons of 
Eritrean descendance who were brought up in Ethiopia 
before Eritrean independence (Riggan, 2011). Their families 
had migrated or been displaced from Eritrea before or 
during the thirty- year Eritrean war of independence (1960 
to 1991). During this period, many Eritreans had sought 
asylum in different neighbouring countries, which laid the 
foundation for the large Eritrean diasporic community 
around the world. When Eritrea won independence in 1991, 
many Eritreans who had spent the years of war in neigh-
bouring countries returned home—including many of those 
in Ethiopia. With the beginning of the Ethiopia–Eritrea war 
in 1998, many of the Eritreans who had initially remained in 
Ethiopia (after independence) were deported to Eritrea.
Josef, a 52 years old refugee in Adi Harush, is one of them. 
His father was among those who fled Eritrea in the late1960s 
due to the war. He assumed a job in a multinational com-
pany in Addis Ababa. In 1985 Josef, who was then grade 
twelve, escaped from military conscription in Ethiopia 
under the Derg military regime by running away to relatives 
in Djibouti. Back from Djibouti, in 1988, he completed high 
school and joined an engineering course in the Ethiopian 
Airforce. Before he finished the course, Eritrea gained 
independence from Ethiopia in May 1991, and his father—
who had been waiting for that day to come—took his family, 
including Josef, back to Eritrea. Josef managed to secure 
a job at Assab fuel refinery. In 1998, when the Eritrean–
Ethiopian war started, Josef was forced to join the military 
service in Eritrea—the service he had run away from in 
Ethiopia ten years ago. He fought in the Eritrea–Ethiopia 
war between 1998 and 2000. He was sent to prison when he 
Box	2:	The	case	of	Jemal
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All informants allege that the amount of the ration given per 
month is not enough for their subsistence. Whenever there is not 
enough food aid from donors, the ration will be downsized and 
sometimes, they are given some cash to fill the gap. According 
to Tadde who lived in camps for nearly two decades: “You don’t 
have the opportunity in the camp to go out and work with the 
knowledge and the skill you have” (Bint-AAU-FA-013-ETH). 
According to him and many others living in the camp, they are un-
able to meet their daily basic needs, let alone chase their dreams. 
The situation is even worse among single mothers who are even 
more vulnerable since they usually have to look after the chil-
dren. As the heavy load of being responsible for the day-to-day 
provision of children rests on women’s shoulders, situations of 
displacement usually characterised by a lack of such provisions 
affect women more than men. Explaining the downside of being 
a single mother and not having connections in the camps, a 
refugee stated: “You will be starved to death. There is a woman 
who cannot get a bar of soap to wash her clothes” (Miheret, cf. 
Box 6) (Bint-AAU-MG-007-ETH). Respondents also men-
tioned that refugees connected with the host community have 
the opportunity to move outside the camp and engage in the in-
formal labour market to augment their income. Single mothers 
of small children with no childcare find it difficult to engage in 
such activities. A single mother’s mobility is more restricted, 
and this, in turn, affects her network and connectivity (cf. 4.1). 
Though all camps host refugees who experience livelihood 
limbo, camps inhabited by the Kunama and Afar refugees who 
mostly fled as a family to escape from the Eritrean regime 
are more vulnerable. As will be discussed in the subsequent 
chapter, these two groups are less connected and less mobile 
and continue to struggle with livelihood limbo in a very precar-
ious environment. Fatuma, a 35-year-old Afar woman who is 
married with two children explans:  
My destination was to go to a place where there is peace, 
not a specific country. It was my husband's decision to 
leave. (…) We do not have any intention of going back 
to Eritrea unless there is peace and food. (…) I earn my 
living making Afar rugs made out of grass (Diborah). At 
times I manage to make one rug or two rugs with simple 
design depending on the week. I buy the rug materials for 
100 birr (US $2.5), and I sell it depending on the design 
and demand for between 100 and 180 birr (US $4.5). They 
give us five kilos flour per person, which is not enough, 
so we borrow from the shop to buy more, and once I earn 
money from the profit, I pay them back (Sint-AAU-MG-
033-ETH).
Living in a condition where they can neither control nor change 
their lives, many expressed feeling trapped in limbo. Living in 
the camp as well as extended waiting periods take a physical 
and emotional toll. In a focus group discussion in Adi Harush 
with refugee representatives, one participant described the 
conditions as follows:
This is a prison where the young’s dream is shattered, 
where they cannot work or bring any change in their lives. 
We are spared from the prisons in Eritrea that is all… the 
refugee camps in Ethiopia, [are] a big prison [where] you 
are allowed to see the sun and feel the wind. [Other than 
that], many of the young have developed disabilities—
physically and mentally. (…) The dreams of our young 
generation are dimmed. Moreover, living as a victim, most 
have become weak physically and mentally (…) those who 
were very strong with a desire for education and work 
live in darkness. That is how I see it. The young could not 
work, marry and have children or change the social status 
and cannot even move (FGD-AAU-MG-022-ETH).
Livelihood limbo in camps 
Eritrean refugees’ livelihoods in Ethiopia can be divided into 
two broader contexts: Camp and urban (see Figure 5). Nearly 
all refugees interviewed near or in the camps (97%) stated that 
the camp provides them with shelter, and 90 per cent said that 
they had not worked in the last month for pay or profit. Life in 
the refugee camps is thus mainly based on the distribution of 
rations through UNHCR and ARRA. Refugees receive between 
10 and 16 kg of cereal (with a small proportion of pulses, oil, 
sugar and salt) monthly, depending on the availability of aid.13  
13 Rations are complemented with supplementary food for targeted vulnerable 
groups. Pregnant and lactating women receive premixed supplementary 
rations (CSB+ oil, and sugar). All children 6-23 months receive, when available, 
super cereal plus (CSB++) or premixed rations ( ARRA, UNHCR , UNWFP, 2016).
criticised the Eritrean regime. When he was released from 
prison, he escaped to Sudan and made it back to Ethiopia in 
2011. This time, Josef returned as a refugee, not as a citizen. 
In 2015, refugees in Adi Harush camp went out on the streets 
complaining about their treatment by the Ethiopian gov-
ernment. This led to the arrest of several refugees accused 
of organising the protest, and Josef was among them. Even 
though he was released after four months of detention, his 
scheduled resettlement to the United States was cancelled as 
he was accused of involvement in violence.   
The Amiche symbolise the long-standing and vicious circle of 
displacement, deportation and the situation of living in limbo 
as a whole. Individuals such as Josef have repeatedly been 
going through different periods of protracted displacement 
and still wait for the time when they can lead a stable life. 
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Urban refugee respondents attempt to meet the expense of 
living in urban centres through mostly informal work. Refugees 
have different levels of access to informal skilled and unskilled 
labour. Nearly all, namely 93 per cent of the refugees we inter-
viewed in the cities stated that they had not worked in the last 
month for pay or profit, mostly due to a lack of work permits, ex-
perience or language competence. Yet surprisingly, despite this, 
many do work, albeit occasionally, to sustain their life. Also, 
in the urban context, refugees are poorly paid. Many of them 
moved to urban centres counting on remittances for survival (see 
Figure 5) which, due to their irregular nature, not always suffice 
to make ends meet there. A story of Nigsti, a 28-year-old female 
refugee in Addis Ababa, illustrates the scope of the challenge the 
livelihood limbo constitutes in Addis Ababa:
First, when he [a broker] saw me, he was happy, and even 
he was interested in giving priority for me in giving me 
a job. Then he asked me for a copy of my ID card and a 
copy of my guarantee person's ID. Then I gave him a copy 
of my refugee ID card. He saw my ID, and he got confused 
and asked me whether I have a kebele  ID card.14  I told 
him that I am a refugee and I do not have an Ethiopian ID 
card. Then the broker immediately changed his attitude 
and told me that for him, it was difficult to connect me 
with employers. He sent other girls to be employed, and 
I stayed in his office and begged him to do something. 
Finally, he agreed to search a job for me, even a smaller 
one. I didn't have an option and agreed with his idea, and 
I joined a cafeteria with a small salary. Even after starting 
the work, the owner of the cafeteria mistreated me 
because of [me] not having a guarantor. He considered 
he did me a favour hiring me in his cafeteria. He used to 
impose more work on me. Finally, I couldn't cope with 
the high workload and the little payment; then I stopped 
working in the cafeteria (BInt-AAU-DA-012-ETH).
14 Residence card also certifying the Ethiopian nationality of the holder
The priority of such vulnerable former pastoral families was 
to seek a place where they get protection and peace. After 
securing protection and shelter, they use different livelihood 
strategies to sustain their family, as Fatuma’s case shows. 
A small proportion of refugees have managed to access paid 
jobs (and are called incentive workers in the official ARRA/
UNHCR language) in the camps: Some teach in the UN-
HCR-run schools, and others are employed by NGOs operating 
in the camps. A few of them, only three per cent in our survey, 
also run businesses. According to Mohammed, an NGO staff 
member working on the power supply in Hitsats, 78 individ-
uals own private generators in Hitsats camp. They sell power 
to their neighbours, bars and shops (Eint-AAU-FA-006-ETH). 
In such situations, sharing and reciprocity are survival mecha-
nisms in the camps. Those sharing a single shelter usually share 
resources. Some of them who do not get resources reciprocate 
by contributing labour. 
Urban refugees’ livelihoods in limbo 
For urban refugees in Addis Ababa, housing, health and food 
are the key challenges—in this order of importance. According 
to our survey information, 87 per cent of urban refugees live in 
a rented house, flat or room. Paying rent for housing is stressful 
because rent is quite high, especially for refugees who do not 
have (a stable) income. After housing, health is the second most 
significant issue for urban refugees. Informants explained that 
they can be flexible with food—they may not eat perhaps for 
a day or more, or survive by eating only once a day for longer 
periods. But when falling sick, money is the only recourse. Var-
ious camp residents reported having moved from Addis Ababa 
back to the camp due to the unaffordable housing costs and the 
expensive health care system.
Figure	5:	Livelihood	portfolio	of	Eritrean	refugees	living	in/out	of	camps	(primary	sources	only)
Source:  UNHCR online database, accessed 20 February 2021, and TRAFIG survey data (n=395) 
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her life due to the training we give” (Eint-AAU-FA-002-ETH). 
Most of them have got the skill to become barbers, wood and 
metal workers, waiters, or coffee sellers. Only refugees who 
have relatives or personal connections manage to get a job in 
the informal market (cf. 3.3 below). Refugees try their best to 
maximise the role of such personal social relations; however, 
the official policies and work practices always impose limita-
tions on their efforts. Many of them are refused employment 
for not having a work permit; they could be expelled or abused 
at work or paid poorly. Consider the case of Hadush, who lives 
in Addis Ababa: Hadush used to work in a garage for US $11 a 
week. While he was working, he sustained an injury to his arm.  
The medical treatment cost a lot of money, but he had no health 
insurance, as his employment was informal. No one covered 
the expenses for treatment. As a result, he quit working and has 
never worked again (SsInt-AAU-DA-008-ETH).
Our research suggests that women seem to be even more 
vulnerable and that among them, there are many victims of 
sexually transmitted diseases like in Almaz’s case. This indi-
cates a prevalence of women who have to resort to sex work as a 
livelihood option.
Furthermore, usually, family members who require the most 
care, such as young children, are given priority at other family 
members' expense. Interviews with single mothers show that they 
had fled Eritrea with their spouse but lost contact after the hus-
band engaged in secondary migration—often intending to reach 
Europe. Or they lost their husbands while fleeing to Ethiopia with 
their children. Some of our informants mentioned that their hus-
bands used to support them, while others confirmed that they fled 
with their children after having agreed with their spouse to opt 
for family reunification (cf. 4.1 below). In general, however, our 
survey findings indicate that transnational network support is the 
most decisive livelihood source of refugees who live outside of 
camps: 44 per cent of urban refugees stated that they—occasion-
ally or regularly—receive money or aid from family members 
or friends living in another country (see Figure 5). Translocal 
support that is provided through one’s network within Ethiopia 
seems to be of less significance—at least in financial terms. 
Although almost one-third of the survey respondents living 
out of camps stated that they do (occasionally) draw on aid or 
welfare benefits from the state or other organisations to support 
themselves (Figure 5), they cannot count on regular support 
like those who live in camps. Life in limbo for Eritrean urban 
refugees thus means being forced into ‘self-reliance’ due to a 
lack of support from aid agencies, yet not having the means 
nor the opportunity to realise their potential. They are neither 
sure about resettlement in a third country nor the prospect of 
working in the host country. As going back to their country of 
origin is not an option as long as the current oppressive regime 
is in power, the plans of individuals to learn and acquire a skill, 
marry and set up a family wane. Refugees often mention factors 
Even though several NGOs provide vocational training and 
many refugees have benefited from a training scheme, there is 
little room for them to use the skills gained due to the absence 
of work permits. A head of a Shire branch of an international 
NGO asserted: “I have not seen any refugee who changed his/
Almaz joined Hitsat refugee camp in 2015. During her stay 
for six months in the camp, she earned some income by 
making tea, preparing food and handicrafts. Later, she heard 
about life as an urban refugee. Coincidently, she also learned 
about an Eritrean family flying to Addis Ababa from the 
United States for a three-month vacation. She came to Addis 
Ababa and started serving the family as a housemaid. She 
was excited when the family promised to take her to America. 
However, after a while, they became dissatisfied with Almaz 
because they wanted her to be in the house continuously. 
Almaz went to ARRA and UNHRC to follow up on her case. 
She had an Eritrean refugee boyfriend who was already 
living in Addis Ababa. He advised her to work at a night-
club whose owner he knew and acted as her guarantor. In 
the nightclub, she worked as a DJ for US $27 per month, a 
salary she couldn't afford to live on, so she also worked as 
a waitress in the same club for eight months. Yet working 
as a waitress didn’t pay well enough either. Her roommate 
complained about her small contribution to the house rent 
and food items. Then her boyfriend left for Australia without 
telling her, and she was forced to engage in sex work. As 
she became increasingly uncomfortable with it, she quit and 
trained for four months at the Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) 
as a nanny. Yet, this training was futile as employers would 
not accept a refugee ID. 
Moreover, her health deteriorated. When she went for a 
check-up, she tested HIV/AIDS positive. Almaz went to a 
protestant church and began studying the Bible. Her belief 
helped her to be strong. In the church, she met a woman who 
employed her as a housemaid without a guarantee. Almaz 
worked in the woman's house for five months before she 
joined another training offered for Eritrean refugees by JRS. 
She got a certificate in hairdressing. However, she could not 
tolerate the high temperature in the beauty salons, so she 
went to a nannies' training. After completing the training, 
she couldn’t work as a nanny because people were afraid of 
her weak physical condition. Creating her own business was 
not an option due to a lack of capital and/or work permit. 
Working in cafeterias as a waitress was difficult for the same 
reasons—when people knew that she was a refugee, they 
did not employ her at all or employed her for a lower salary 
than they would usually pay. Facing a continuous increase 
in rent, a strict house owner who does not tolerate rent 
payments later than on due date and high cost of food, Almaz 
currently only makes ends meet thanks to the help of her 
friends living in Europe (BInt-AAU-DA-012-ETH).  
Box	4:	Almaz’s	story	of	urban	livelihood	vulnerability	
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such as a lack of work permits and job opportunities as the most 
important structural problems. Hopes associated with the new 
policy on work permits for refugees are therefore high but have 
not yet materialised. In Almaz’ case, for instance, ARRA told 
her that the government was still working on the implementa-
tion mechanism of the proclamation when they approached the 
agency on this matter (BInt-AAU-DA-012-ETH). 
Concluding	remarks
In this chapter, we discussed Eritrean refugees’ state of limbo 
in indefinite periods of waiting. Many Eritreans have been up 
in the air since the long war of independence (1960 to 1991). 
Eritrean youth are displaced from their family when they have 
to join military training camps—the beginning of an indefinite 
military service. Those who managed to run away from the mil-
itary and join refugee camps and towns and cities in Ethiopia 
continue another phase of uncertain and indefinite waiting: Their 
aspiration to study, work, establish a family and lead a stable 
life, all hope to transit to ‘productive life’ is put on hold as new 
legislation on work permits for refugees, for instance, is not yet 
implemented. Our results nevertheless show that even the most 
vulnerable refugees are actively trying to break out of limbo.  
The downward spiral triggered by displacement is often 
related to fractured connections. Context and strategies vary 
significantly between camps, ethnicities (Kunama, Afar and 
Tigrinya), and households. We found that the major difference 
between camps and urban contexts was the type of vulnerabili-
ties that refugees experience and their strategies to overcome or 
at least reduce them. Out-of-camp populations in general have 
better access to informal work. This is crucial as long as official 
work permits are missing but also carries risks to engage in 
high-risk activities. Our results also indicate that encampment 
contributes to protracting a displacement situation. The longer 
the refugees remain in the camp, the less likely they are to find 
a way out. But out-of-camp residents, too, stated that they rely 
partly on aid or welfare benefits. Across all researched areas, 
long periods of waiting lead to frustrations, despair and mental 
problems. The most vulnerable households are often those led 
by single mothers. 
Key findings
•	 Eritreans have experienced a long-standing situation 
of living in limbo due to a vicious circle of displace-
ment, increasing vulnerability, and the lack of durable 
solutions.
•	 Indefinite waiting (in camps and urban centres) and the 
resulting deterioration of livelihood options dispropor-
tionately affect those who are not or less connected. 
•	 Female households chiefs and women whose relations 
and connections have been fractured en route are more 
prone to be affected by rising precarity than others.    
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future. As general tendency, the share of those who wish to move 
on is slightly larger among refugees who live outside of camps 
(89%) compared to those living in camps (87%), larger among 
those living in cities (93%) than in rural areas (83%), larger 
among younger people (91% of those 30 years and younger) than 
among older refugees (65% of those older than 50 years), and sig-
nificantly larger among the higher educated (93% of those with 
secondary or tertiary education) than among the less educated 
respondents (20% of those who completed primary school or are 
illiterate). For those who have existing ties to family members or 
friends outside of Ethiopia, the share is even higher (98%). Yet, 
83% of those refugees who stated that their personal network 
does not extend beyond the current place of living also wish to 
migrate to another country if they had the means. According 
to our survey, Canada, the United States, Australia, the United 
Kingdom and Germany are the countries that the respondents 
would ideally like to move to.
While many plan to move on, surprisingly few (7%) of those 
we spoke to have actually tried to visit or move on to another 
country. Migrants encounter different kinds of obstacles, 
hurdles and barriers to their mobility aspirations. 70 per cent 
of the survey respondents stated that they had encountered 
diverse barriers to mobility, forcing them to abandon their 
migration plans or take irregular routes. While 94 per cent 
of the respondents mentioned difficulty to overcome visa and 
border restrictions as the most significant barrier to mobility, 
62 per cent of the interviewed Eritreans highlighted the lack of 
financial means to cover transportation costs, particularly the 
high costs of services provided by smugglers or other agents of 
the migration industry. 50 per cent stated that they lack support 
from others for a journey of secondary migration. 
Those who already experienced migration across multiple bor-
ders (besides the border crossing from Eritrea to Ethiopia) re-
ported spending more time waiting for the next border crossing 
opportunity in cities and camps than actually being on the 
move. According to our informants, border crossings are based 
on complicated power dynamics involving local smugglers, the 
refugees, former migrants and relatives living in Europe, the 
United States or the Middle East and elsewhere who fund the 
journey. Cross-border mobility often depends on the access to 
support by family members, relatives and friends that live in 
different locations (cf. Belloni, 2016a). They exchange informa-
tion continuously, share emotions and maintain a sense of be-
longing within a large network through calls and social media 




Forced displacement and migration are deeply embedded in the 
history of Eritrea. This section will show how protracted con-
flict and a long history of displacement has created a complex 
and dynamic web of transnational networks. 
Eritreans’ mobility history and intentions
Several decades of migration have created a large Eritrean 
diaspora mainly based in East Africa, the Middle East, Europe 
and North America. Compared to the country’s total popu-
lation, estimated at six million, the Eritrean diaspora is also 
growing very fast. According to the Atlas of Migration, it grew 
from around 294,000 in 2005 to 752,000 in 2019 (European 
Union, 2020, p. 62). The decades of exodus have triggered and 
maintained a specific transnational orientation of Eritrean so-
ciety that stands in stark contrast to the country's international 
isolation. Many Eritreans in the diaspora maintain strong links 
not only to their kin at home but also to Eritrea itself (Al-Ali 
et al.,2001; Bernal, 2006; Hirt, 2013). This has led to enduring 
and close economic, political and symbolic ties between those 
outside and inside Eritrea. 
Translocality evolves through mobility, flows and intercon-
nections. It is constituted in relational spaces that materialise 
through agents’ everyday practice (Etzold et al., 2017, p. 53). 
Ethiopia is not only a place where many Eritreans live but also a 
place from where they embark on a longer migratory trajectory 
to reach final destinations (Horwood & Kate, 2016). In this sit-
uation, the camps became transit points, characterised by con-
tinuous comings and goings. New people move in while others 
leave. Eritreans move from refugee camps to nearby towns and 
cities within Ethiopia as soon as they can afford to do so. Tens 
of thousands of Eritreans have been using Ethiopia as a transit 
point. Since the late 2000s, they have been moving mainly to 
Europe through Sudan and Libya, the Central Mediterranean, 
or Sinai, Egypt, to Israel. Though it is difficult to estimate the 
actual number of people who travelled onward via these routes,  
a survey conducted in 2014 revealed that over 80 per cent of 
Eritrean refugees sheltered in Ethiopian camps stated that they 
had plans to move on (Samuel Hall, 2014). 
Our own survey supports these findings yet also shows the 
significance of existing transnational networks for onward 
mobility: In total, 88 per cent of interviewed Eritrean refugees 
intend to move on to another place or country to live there in the 
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Networks and connections do not always provide the assistance 
needed to move to the aspired destination. Especially women, 
children and elderly people are in precarious positions. Most 
stories have in common that men (help to) plan, organise and 
put mobility into action. Women, elderly people, persons with 
disabilities and children are therefore especially affected by 
problems connected to a lack of financial resources or social 
connectivity.
The quality of connectivity varies greatly. The amount of as-
sistance that a network can provide depends on the situation of 
the persons that constitute the network at a given point in time. 
Family members provide the most assistance as compared to 
friends and acquaintances, as the following statement shows:
Translocal networks and mobility
All people are embedded in particular social figurations. Yet, 
the amount, quality and spatial expansion of network relations 
differ significantly between different groups (Etzold et al., 
2019)—also between the Eritrean refugees we encountered in 
Ethiopia.  Two out of three survey respondents said that they 
do not have significant network relations with anyone beyond 
their current place of living. As Figure 6 demonstrates, both the 
number and share of those who are only locally but not trans-
locally connected is much higher among refugees who live in 
camps than those who live outside of camps. In the same vein, 
urban refugees have by far more translocal connections (i.e. to 
other places in Ethiopia) and are much more solidly embedded 
in transnational networks (i.e. having personal relations to 
persons outside of Ethiopia) than those living in rural areas. 
For instance, 83 per cent of urban refugees in Addis Ababa are 
transnationally connected. In comparison, only nine per cent of 
Afar refugees who live in Aysaita camp and only 13 per cent of 
Tigriyna who live in Mai Aini camp have these links to persons 
in other countries.
The quality and spatial scope of social networks play a signif-
icant role in all stages of displacement and migration. 81 per 
cent of all survey respondents stated that they did not have any 
support by others for crossing the border to Ethiopia. Among 
those 19 per cent who could rely on their networks for mobility, 
it was mostly the support by family members or other network 
contacts in third countries, followed by support from within 
Eritrea and by relatives already living in Ethiopia that helped 
to facilitate mobility. Our findings indicate that the existence 
of transnational networks before departure is certainly not a 
prerequisite for cross-border mobility to Ethiopia, while trans-
national connectivity can indeed pave the way for journeys to 
other countries of refuge.
This is even more evident for mobility after initial displace-
ment. Our research shows that onward mobility from the camps 
is primarily determined by the refugees’ network size and the 
quality of their connections. Networks enable refugees to move 
out of camps, secure livelihoods and widen future chances. 
Officially, as we discussed above, the out-of-camp policy (OCP) 
requires financial means to move out of camps and finance 
the cost of living in urban centres. Networks and connectivity 
facilitate and cover the cost of onward mobility to neighbouring 
countries, Europe and other destinations where network con-
tacts live (see Figure 7). Irregular secondary migrations require 
networks and resources to find smugglers and cover smugglers’ 
charges and costs of transportation. In the cities, networks help 
to cover the cost of onward mobility, provide information about 
job opportunities, support integration, get business licenses and 
cover costs of living. 
Figure	6:	Survey	respondents’	personal	networks	beyond	
their	place	of	living	
Source:  TRAFIG survey data, n=394
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The following example of Yordanos and her family ties illus-
trates how multiple connections between migrants, ex-mi-
grants, and non-migrants facilitate material exchange and flow 
of knowledge and thus displaced people’s mobility. Having 
strong network relationships with several people at various 
places lowers the cost and risks of movement and increases the 
possibility of further movements. Yordanos’ case also shows 
how the family’s previous migration history was significant in 
each individual’s mobility. In reaching their current destina-
tions, the family members established socio-spatial connections 
in-between, which further broadened and diversified their 
social networks. Yordanos was able to draw on the relationships 
already established to enable and ensure her onward mobility. 
The example also illustrates how the level of displaced people’s 
mobility increases in the process of being mobile. Moving 
broadens the respective social networks and allows refugees 
to explore opportunities and thus, in turn, facilitate further 
mobility. As the family’s social networks expanded and diver-
sified, the pre-departure figuration also transformed. In this 
family story told by Yordanos, Biruk’s success in getting sup-
port from a charity and resettling in Canada made him central 
in facilitating the family’s new global figuration. His success 
opened opportunities for his brothers’ and sisters’ mobility, and 
this continues to expand. However, plans can also not succeed. 
The one person on whom rested all (financial) responsibility 
might fail to succeed or even die en route taking down the 
family's hopes. 
When we arrived, we were four. Each of us paid US 
$1,500 for a smuggler up to the Ethiopian border.(...) One 
had a US visa. He had to come to Ethiopia because he 
could not get an exit visa as he did not finish his national 
service. (…) he left in less than two months. One had a 
brother in Germany and left through Libya shortly. The 
other one also had a sister in Sweden and left through 
Libya as well. (…) I was the only one who had no close rel-
ative abroad. However, thanks to God, I also have cousins 
in Juba, Canada and the US who support my survival and 
pay my kids’ school fees” (Sint-AAU-FA-001-ETH).
Those who have links to the cities’ social and economic 
networks and those who have external resources to rely on 
are more mobile than refugees who have no such resources at 
all. Others who have access to resources move quickly. Some 
move on within days of arrival in the camp. For such refugees, 
the refugee camps are transit spaces where arrangements for 
onward travel to the cities are made. Their time in the camps 
revolves around visiting UNHCR and ARRA offices to obtain 
papers. While talking about this situation, a longtime camp 
resident jokingly explained: “Those who arrive these days are 
stylish and classy. They are bringing their suitcases and equip-
ment, and all of this. And they move on quickly—the newcomers 
are more like tourists actually” (Bint-AAU-Mu-020-ETH). The 
refugees with well-established connections abroad often arrive 
with pre-arranged travel plans. Various refugees explained that 
many of their friends and companions were able to leave the 
camps due to the financial support provided through trans-
national networks. In general, all respondents agreed that the 
financial capacity of the network determines the pathways of 
refugees. 
Figure	7:	Countries	in	which	Eritrean	refugees	living	in	Ethiopia	have	personal	contacts		
Source:  TRAFIG survey data, n=137 (only those who have connections beyond Ethiopia; 252 persons stated that they have no connec-
tions beyond their place of living)  Note: Sequence of countries clockwise, starting with USA, Germany, Eritrea, Australia, etc.
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Yordanos is a 20-year-old woman who is living in Shire. Her family consists of seven siblings, Johannes (m), Samuel (m), Freta (f), 
Akbert (f), Merhawit (f), Biruk (m) and Yordanos (f)—from oldest to youngest. 
Samuel was the first to move out. He is 38 years old, ranks second in the birth order and left Eritrea through Sudan in 2007. Once he 
had arrived there, Samuel did not have anyone who could support him to continue his journey. As a result, he had to stay in Sudan 
for seven years. He only reached Switzerland, where he lives now, after receiving support from his younger brother, Biruk, who had, 
in the meantime, made it to Canada—even though he had left home a few years after Samuel. In 2012, Biruk, now 28 and the sixth in 
the birth order, escaped Eritrea through Sudan with his friends. Before they entered Sudan, they were caught by human traffickers 
who took them hostage and led them to Sinai in Egypt. Subsequently, their family in Eritrea was asked to pay 150,000 nakfas (equiv-
alent to US $10,000). They did all they 
could and were able to pay the required 
amount of money. However, the traffickers 
asked for an additional 1.5 million nakfas. 
As they were only able to raise 600,000 
nakfas, Biruk was detained and spent two 
months in their hands. After this agonising 
time, a charity helped to get him released 
and facilitated his transfer to Cairo. After 
staying there for two years, he got reset-
tled to Canada. While in Canada, he paid 
130,000 nakfas for his brother Samuel who 
was stranded in Sudan and helped him 
reach Switzerland from Sudan via Libya and 
Italy crossing the Mediterranean Sea. 
Merhawit, the fifth in the family line, was 
the third to move to Sweden. Her journey 
was, nevertheless, different from that of 
her brothers. She left the country legally 
through a family reunification process to 
join her husband. As she had completed her 
national service duty, she could leave the 
country legally and went to Sweden. She 
was, however, not allowed to take all of her 
children—those older than five years old had to stay. Merhawit was only allowed to take the youngest. The rest of her children, 12, 
13, and 14 years old, joined them later through irregular routes via Sudan and Ethiopia.
Merhawit’s husband fled to Sudan in 2014. There, he met Samuel, her brother and stayed with him for a couple of months. Her hus-
band was able to move on within a year because of his family abroad. At the time, nine of his siblings lived overseas, most of them in 
Europe and Israel. They were, therefore, able to support him on his journey from Sudan to Sweden.
Yordanos, who was serving in the military in Eritrea and the youngest sister, fled to Shire, Ethiopia, in June 2018. Sixth months later, 
her sister Freta, the third-born of the family, followed her along with her husband and their two children. In Shire, both sisters re-
ceived support through Merhawit’s in-laws who helped them move out of the camp and live in a rented house. Yordanos’ and her sis-
ter’s choice of destination were still primarily based on the fact that their brother Biruk lived in Canada. Shortly after the research 
team left Shire in March 2020, Yordanos’ sponsorship paper from her brother arrived.
Their parents, their 34-year-old sister Akbert, the fourth-born, and the 40-year-old and eldest brother Johannes still live in Eritrea. 
Both are married and have children of their own. They also aspire to move out of the country with their families in the future. How-
ever, the family decided to support Yordanos first and then her sister. The preference for Yordanos was based on the fact that she was 
single and did not need as much support on her way as a family would. 
Though scattered and living in different parts of the world, the family shares responsibilities and resources. Her brother in Canada 
is mainly in charge of Yordanos and Freta along with Freta’s family; his responsibility ranges from sending money to facilitating the 
sponsorship process. Samuel, the brother in Switzerland, mainly provides for and works towards his wife’s mobility—whom he met 
while in Sudan and later married. However, he also supports the parents and, sporadically, his siblings. His sister Merhawit who 
lives in Sweden, primarily provides for her own children but also helps her parents and siblings (Bint-AAU-MG-028-ETH).
Box	5:	Yordanos'	family	history
Source: Own empirical data
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they also frequently mentioned frictions or ruptures on all these 
levels. The economic stress of displacement and the fragmented 
nature of clandestine journeys have a considerable impact on 
family and other social ties. According to our survey, almost 
one-third of Eritrean refugees had been involuntarily separated 
from their family on their journeys, while 18 per cent had split 
up on purpose for strategic reasons. 
The following case illustrates how dynamic the displacement 
process is and how close forced movements’ success and failure 
are. Akberet, who lives in Hitsats camp with her nine-year-old 
daughter, is an example of a life-changing rupture resulting in 
gendered vulnerability:
I have neither a family member nor a distant relative 
abroad. I left Eritrea on the advice of my former husband 
who was by then in Malta. He cut every communication 
with me after my arrival here. He sent us money once 
from Malta and stopped every communication with us. I 
come from a peasant family. My parents are now old, and 
my two brothers are in the military [Eritrean]. My only 
sister arrived two months ago, and she is now living with 
me in this shelter (…). I am in my fifth year in this shelter, 
and many people joined me in this room and most of them 
have left [moved on and resettled], whereas I have never 
gone beyond Shire (Sint-AAU-FA-005-ETH).
Women such as Akberet and Mihret (below) are vulnerable in 
many ways: Often, ruptures come unexpectedly and affect their 
well-being. The feeling of loneliness combined with various 
structural disadvantages that women in Ethiopia have to cope 
with lead to more profound poverty than ever before (cf. 4.1). 
Ruptures in connectivity and mobility 
Immobility, i.e. being confined in the camps or being stuck 
in informal precarious conditions in urban areas, conversely 
hinders refugees from exploring opportunities. Our results 
indicate that both trends reinforce each other over time. This 
means that those who had been stuck in a refugee camp for 
extended periods often had to cope with decreasing options of 
moving on— which led to remarkable high levels of frustra-
tion. Those who were already relatively mobile often saw their 
options of mobility increase over time—though the time spent 
in transit was often considerable. Overall, our survey findings 
clearly indicate that refugees without network connections 
beyond the current place of living are much more likely to live 
in protracted displacement (Figure 8): On average, refugees 
who are embedded in transnational figurations have lived in 
displacement for four years, while those whose networks are lo-
cally bound are in a protracted situation for six years. This can 
be interpreted in two ways: First, those who are transnationally 
connected move out of displacement quicker; second, recent 
arrivals are better transnationally connected than the previous 
ones, like Yordanos in the case discussed above. 
Integrating themselves in several places of origin, transit and 
arrival—displaced people develop not only dense relationships 
but also experienced ruptures. On the one hand, the interviewed 
displaced persons recounted how they established new trans-
local networks, sought to keep up ties with their contacts and 
maintain relationships with their place of origin. On the other, 
Mihret, a single mother with two children, got separated 
from her husband on the move. She fled to Ethiopia in 2013 
for the first time with her husband, an ex ELF (Eritrean 
Liberation Front) fighter, leaving their firstborn with her 
mother. Back then, they were taken to Hitsats refugee camp. 
After a year, her husband wanted to leave Ethiopia, and 
Mihret did not mind as long as they stayed together.
Her husband, who had relatives overseas who supported 
him, was eager to leave Ethiopia as quickly as possible. He 
did not want to leave five-months-pregnant Mihert behind 
and took her with him to Sudan. On their way to Sudan, they 
were taken hostage by human traffickers.
I was in the fifth month of my pregnancy. They [Suda-
nese traffickers] asked us to pay them 40,000 nakfas 
(US $2,666). Those who had had the money paid and 
continued their journey. Those of us who could not afford 
to pay were taken to Khartum and sold to an Eritrean 
[trafficker] for 60,000 nakfas. My husband’s siblings 
Box	6:	Impact	of	ruptured	connectivity	
Source:  TRAFIG survey data, n=394
Figure	8:	Duration	of	displacement	(in	years	since	departure)	
in	relation	to	connections	beyond	the	place	of	living
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Concluding	remarks
A long history of forced displacement and migration has 
created a complex and dynamic web of transnational Eritrean 
networks. Our findings illustrate how a lack of connectivity 
restrains the range of movements—or, vice versa, how connec-
tivity facilitates multiple connections between migrants, ex- 
migrants and non-migrants. As mobility requires resources, the 
amount of assistance the network provides is crucial to move on 
and eventually achieve the aspirations that motivated individ-
uals to leave Eritrea. 
Our research found that family members provide the most 
important part of assistance, followed by support from friends 
and acquaintances. Those who have links to the cities’ social 
and economic networks and those who have external resources 
to rely on, in particular transnational connections, are more 
mobile than refugees who lack such resources. In other words, 
families’ previous history of migration is a major factor for 
the type of mobility and destination. We also found that those 
who have such a family history and access to resources moved 
on quickly. Some of them moved on within days of arrival in 
a camp. For such refugees, the camps are transit spaces where 
they make arrangements for onward travel to the cities. Immo-
bility, conversely, is often a sign of a lack of networks, keeps 
refugees in camps and constrains them from exploring liveli-
hood opportunities. 
Social disarticulation, as in Mihert’s story, is common among 
the displaced population. Survivors hardly get psychological 
support, and their traumata are exacerbated by the socio-eco-
nomic conditions common to protracted displacement situa-
tions. They have to negotiate anxieties and ambivalences daily 
while trying to stay afloat. Mihert, being a single mother, is 
forced to support her kids doing domestic chores for better-off 
refugees inside the camp. She deplored not being able to 
maintain social relationships with other refugees and locals due 
to a lack of time and resources. Those who would need most 
to expand their connections to raise support are deprived of 
this opportunity by the very condition they need to overcome. 
Stranded single mothers, in particular, are neither able to main-
tain previously established connections nor to create desper-
ately needed new ones. Instead, they often remain immobilised 
either in camps or cities, in precarious circumstances, waiting 
in limbo for an indefinite time.
Key findings
•	 Protracted displacement did not only result in im-
mobilization, decreased livelihoods, and increased 
vulnerability, but also a complex and dynamic web of 
transnational networks that opened up new options, 
opportunities and migration pathways. 
•	 The capacity to break out of limbo and move forward 
is not only determined by each refugee’s networks, but 
foremost the quality of that networks in availing neces-
sary financial resources.
•	 Ruptures en route causing unexpected immobility and 
vulnerabilities are often related to families’ previous 
history of migration. The ability to provide the as-
sistance needed to move to the aspired destination is 
nevertheless often fluctuating.    
covered the fee for him. (…) But I had had nothing, neither 
brothers nor sisters. (…) They [her husband’s siblings] 
were not willing to cover mine. As a result, my husband 
left me in Sudan and moved to Italy. (…) I could not get a 
person who would be able to cover the 60,000 nakfas. (...) 
The human trafficker threatened that he would sell me. He 
told me that it was not his fault but my husband’s.”
In the end, Mihert was fortunate to escape after weeks of 
captivity. But she found herself in a precarious situation. 
She was sick and had a miscarriage. With financial help 
from Eritrean and Ethiopian  refugees in Sudan, she was 
able to return to Eritrea. After her return, Mihert recounts 
that she could neither find relief nor happiness and faced 
considerable economic and political hurdles. She fled again 
with the support of a smuggler who locked her up and raped 
her for months. Mihert managed to run away and again 
returned to Eritrea. 
In Eritrea, she found out that she was pregnant and gave 
birth to a baby girl. However, she did not dare to speak 
about what she had encountered during her journey. Today 
she recapitulates:
Life became tough for me; I have undergone many 
torments. Amidst these, God has brought this peace deal 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea. As peace prevailed, I told 
my mother that I would go to Ethiopia with my kids. So I 
did (Bint-AAU-MG-007-ETH).
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tion from both sides of the borders. As a result, many harbour 
grudges and suspicions against one another. In other words, the 
ethnocultural commonality between the two has been over-
shadowed by the animosity and suspicion created politically. 
The Afar and the Kunama, on the other hand, are political 
minorities in Eritrea and Ethiopia. They consider themselves 
victims of political marginality. Yet, there are also significant 
demographic and political differences between the Afar and 
Kunama in Ethiopia. While the Afar are a population of over 
1.4 million and ‘self-administer’ themselves in Afar regional 
state, the Kunama are a small population of less than four thou-
sand (0.07% of Tigray region) (CSA, 2007). Afar and Kunama 
refugees are received and hosted by their co-ethnic groups who 
feel sympathetic towards them because of ethnic and language 
commonality and their shared history of being victimsed by the 
ethnic Tigrinya (cf. footnote 7 for terminology). Eritrean Afar 
and Kunama blame the Tigrinya in Eritrea for being in part 
responsible for the conditions they fled from. From the perspec-
tive of a discriminated group, both do not differentiate between 
Tigrinya speakers on either side of the border, grouping Tigrinya 
speakers into one faction because of similar inter-group relations 
with them. These joint experiences overlay possible intra-group 
differences, which Kunama and Afar often acknowledge.
The natural and social environment of interaction between the 
refugees and hosts is also different (see map on page 8). The 
Tigrinya, who come mainly from highland Eritrea (Anseba 
region, Debub region and Maekel region with Eritrea’s capital 
Asmara, see map on p. 8), are relatively urbanised and edu-
cated. In Tigray, they are received close to small towns with 
less or no agricultural activity. Most of the out-of-camp benefi-
ciaries are Tigrinya. The Afar, are primarily herders and come 
from eastern arid lowland (southern region). They come to an 
environment of pastoral life in the Afar region of Ethiopia. The 
Kunama come from the western lowland area of Gash Barka, a 
fertile agricultural area where they engaged in agriculture and 
livestock herding activities. Shiraro district, where they are 
hosted, is also a relatively fertile agricultural area in Tigray, 
enabling them to continue with some of their traditional liveli-
hood activities. 
Refugee–host interactions and integration
One of the most significant social interactions between the 
camp-based refugees and the host communities take place 
during weekly markets outside the camps in nearby towns. In 
Mai Tsebri, a small town situated between Adi Harush and Mai 
Aini camps, refugees and residents regularly interact during the 
weekly market. Semira, a local from the hosting community 
who owns a shop in the market, for example, interacts with 
many refugees who buy from her. Her customers range from 
those who do their daily shopping to refugees who purchase 
different commodities for their retail shops inside the camps. 
3.4	Building	alliances	across	communities
Eritrean refugee interactions with host communities take place 
in different contexts. These are determined by a range of fac-
tors, such as historical experiences, ethnicity and the political 
and economic environments. In this section, we will discuss 
the different contexts that shape refugee–host interactions, refu-
gees’ interaction and integration with their hosts and the role 
local networks play in securing refugees’ livelihoods. 
Contexts of local interactions and integration
As discussed in the section Governing the influx of Eritrean 
refugees, the border opening following the recent peace deal 
resulted in a new influx of refugees that exceeded the camps' 
capacity. Thus, ARRA and UNHCR allowed refugees with 
financial resources to rent rooms outside the camps causing the 
host communities in smaller towns to complain about a hike in 
prices on rental houses, food, and other services caused by the 
refugees' presence. In Shire and Mai Tsebri, daily labourers, 
students, and government employees complained that they were 
unable to cope with the cost of living in the areas with a high 
number of refugees. Seemingly paradoxical, similar complaints 
were also raised by refugees who lived in the camps for an ex-
tended period of time and pointed out that the new arrivals were 
better connected and received more remittances from relatives 
abroad. 
There are significant differences between camps and urban 
contexts. As discussed above, the refugee camps are situated in 
environments where the refugees and the hosts share ethnicity, 
language, religion, ways of life and cultural practices. The 
fact that the host and refugee communities share a common 
language, culture, and religion are enabling factors for interac-
tions. However, the recent political histories across the border 
play crucial roles in shaping the interactions and the extents of 
solidarity between the refugees and hosts communities. This 
has created differences in the refugee–host communities’ inter-
actions among the Afar, Tigrinya and Kunama. 
The Tigrinya and the Tigrayans (Tigrinya speakers from 
Tigray state) share a common ethnicity, language and cultural 
practices and fought on a common front against the Ethiopian 
central government until 1991. The two groups have dominated 
the political, economic and socio-cultural landscape in each 
country since then. The Tigrinya have dominated politics in 
Eritrea since the war of independence. In Ethiopia, too, the 
Tigrayans led by the TPLF played a significant role in defeating 
the former military regime. Since then, they dominated the 
Ethiopian political and economic domains until the change of 
government in 2018 that brought Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed 
to power in 2018. Nevertheless, the two fought a bloody border 
war between 1998 and 2000, in which around one hundred 
thousand people died and tens of thousands faced deporta-
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shop instead of his name. This made him feel uncomfortable. 
Eritrean refugees and Tigrayan hosts who are on good terms 
typically try to avoid talking about politics. Before the current 
conflict between the central and the regional government in 
Tigray, the biggest challenge for local integration was, however, 
not related to local politics, but to find the necessary guarantor. 
On the one hand, this process often transcended ethnic, age or 
gender divisions and was observed to be highly individualistic 
(see section 3.5). On the other, these factors still largely deter-
mine the likelihood of building up personal relationships that 
are necessary to establish a livelihood. Especially before policy 
reform and the peace deal of 2018, the restriction on camps 
was so tight that very few managed to leave, look for jobs and 
integrate. Girmay (see below) is one of those who against all 
odds managed to establish local networks and win the solidarity 
of the local host community.
Interpersonal relationships are vital if one wants to showcase 
one’s skill and eke out income beyond the monthly rations pro-
vided in camps. Girmay is a Tigrinya-speaking young Eritrean 
refugee, married with two children, who lived in Adi Harush 
camp for almost a decade. He used to work as a tailor while 
attending school before he left Eritrea. Once he had settled in 
Adi-Harush refugee camp, he started working as a waiter for 
two years in a small tea shop owned by a local Ethiopian in the 
nearby town of Mai Tsebri. Girmay remembers the situation: 
“It was a tough time. The payment was very little. It was not 
easy to live on. On top of that, the refugee law was stringent.” 
He had to walk from the refugee camp to his workplace every 
day, and at times spent nights hiding at his workplace. His 
acquaintances and contacts established during his work as a 
waiter in Mai Tsebri put him in touch with more people from 
the local community, enabling him to explore other opportu-
nities. Local tailors, whom he got to know while working as a 
waiter, were replacing their manual tailoring machine with an 
electric one. Girmay took the opportunity and asked whether 
he could rent the manual tailoring machine. Since there was no 
electricity in the camp, he preferred a manual machine. 
In collaboration with a refugee friend, Girmay rented the 
machine for 300 birr per month and started to work in shifts 
with him. Until his friend left the camp via Libya to Italy about 
three years ago, both had paid the rental fee together. Besides 
the money he had earned repairing and making clothes for the 
last seven years, the ration he received played a significant role. 
Without it, he would probably not cover his expenses, including 
his food and other monthly expenditures. With the ration, 
though, he can provide for his family. Girmay holds that the op-
portunity to get a tailoring machine arose because of his close 
contact with the hosting community. According to him, main-
taining a good refugee–host relationship is essential to resolve 
Semira mentions that their relationship is characterised by 
interaction and trust: “I never faced any troubles with them. So 
far, they always came and paid me back.” She gives the refu-
gees goods worth up to around 2,000 birr (approx. US $60) on 
credit, which they pay when they receive their monthly ration or 
remittance (Sint-AAU-MG-017-ETH).
Language, cultural and religious similarities also encourage 
individuals to interact and communicate. The strength of 
alliances and trust, such as that between Semira and her refugee 
customers, build on the frequency and variety of interactions. 
They are stronger in contexts where the camps are situated 
close to the settlement of host communities. Hitsats, Adi Ha-
rush, Berhale and Aysaita camps are within walking distance 
from smaller towns, while Mai Aini camp is farther away. 
Shimelba is located in an isolated rural area and far from any 
urban centre. Refugees of the four more connected camps have 
more options for exchange with the host communities than 
those from the more remote locations. The case of Abraha, who 
runs a small business in Adi Harush camp, is a good example. 
He narrated his story as follows: 
I was trained as a metal worker in the Eritrean military. 
I escaped from the military service in 2010 and set up my 
own workshop in peri-urban Asmara. I worked there for 
four years until I was caught by the police. I was impris-
oned for three months. When I managed to escape again, I 
decided to leave (…). I arrived here in 2015. Just two weeks 
after my arrival, I went out and looked for a metal work-
shop. There was only one small workshop in Mai Tsebri 
town. I asked them whether I could help them, which they 
accepted. That helped me to prove my skill to them. They 
liked my skill very much and even introduced me to people 
in other towns up to 50 km away. Now, the owner of that 
workshop is the godfather of my son. We are a family. Now, 
I work in the camp and outside the camp. From the money 
I made, I established this café15  (…). So far, nobody has 
asked me for a work permit (Bint-AAU-FA-019-ETH).
The shared language and culture emboldened Abraha to look 
for a job just two weeks after his arrival. The proximity to a 
semi-urban centre with a metal workshop set the ground for his 
economic integration. The economic relationship transcended 
into the cultural and personal sphere when the owner of the 
metal workshop became his son’s godfather. While Abraha is 
aware of generalised prejudices and suspicions on the political 
level, as discussed above, he separates these from interactions 
and friendships on the individual level. Abraha complains that 
some Tigrayan used to call him Sha’abia16  at the metal work-
15 Abraha runs a café inside Adi Harush refugee camp. Many refugees run small 
businesses inside camps, without being required to get work permits and 
paying taxes.
16 Sha’abia is an Arabic term for Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (ruling party 
in Eritrea).
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Clan membership is a clear line of separation between the 
Afar. But beyond this level—as hosts, refugees, NGO workers 
and state officials continued to emphasise—the rule is: “Afar 
is Afar”. Aisha, 21 years old, married with a two-year-old 
daughter, explains: 
“Some Afar who want to do business, like my father, go to 
the woreda17  to get a work permit and an ID. He is a clan 
leader, and he has lived with the Afar community, so he 
does not have any problems finding a job. As long as you 
are Afar, there is no problem. It does not matter whether 
you are Eritrean or Ethiopian” (Bint-AAU-MG-031-ETH).
According to this interview with Aisha, her father managed to 
get a work permit before the new policy came into place. The 
ID card she mentioned is not a refugee ID card, but one Ethi-
opian citizens get. Registered as members of a kebele with an 
ID card, especially in such peripheral border areas where they 
share the same language, refugees enjoy all citizens’ rights. 
This proves how local relations and factors like ethnicity, 
language, social organisations (kinship), and the political set up 
matter for refugee–host communities’ relationships. 
In cities such as Shire, Mekelle and the capital Addis Ababa, 
refugee–host relationships are relatively robust, mutual and in-
formal. However, the greater sense of anonymity in a large city 
might also contribute to the fact that only a comparatively low 
share of urban refugees (8%) feel accepted by others in Addis 
Ababa’s neighbourhoods (for comparison, the total average of 
perceived acceptance by locals is 31%). Nonetheless, multiple 
interactions inevitably take place between Eritrean refugees 
and host community members. Together with the shared 
language, culture, and history, these local network contacts 
allowed some refugees to navigate significant obstacles to their 
livelihoods. With their large markets, cities provide more alter-
native livelihood opportunities than small towns or the camps 
themselves. Prospects to generate some income depend mainly 
on networks—local and transnational—that open opportuni-
ties for informal employment. Addis offers better chances to 
find ways around restrictions, but there is little humanitarian 
support. Tekeste, a thirty-year-old refugee who lives in Gofa 
Mebrathayil condominium houses, has been in Addis Ababa 
since 2013. He survives on the remittance he occasionally re-
ceives from his cousins who live in South Sudan, Switzerland, 
America and Canada. He explains:
I am dependent on remittances from my cousins. I opened 
a bar having saved the small amount of money I peri-
odically receive from them to be at least gradually self- 
17 In Ethiopian administrative structure woreda is equivalent to district. The 
administrative structure is organized from top to bottom as follows: Federal/
central government-regional government-zonal administration-woreda 
administration and kebele administration.
livelihood needs. It increased his capacity to explore and secure 
alternative livelihood options even though his mobility outside 
the camp was limited because of the higher level of restrictions. 
As another benefit of his alliances, he managed to get a loan for 
goods enabling him to open a small shop in the refugee camp 
that brings in more revenues for his family (Sint-AAU-MG-
011-ETH).
Role of local networks for securing livelihoods
In Shimelba camp, which is in a relatively fertile agricultural 
north-western part of Tigray, the relationship between refugees 
and hosts is mainly built around sharecropping. The Kunama 
who have been stranded in the camp for over fifteen years now 
are mainly from an agricultural background. They contribute 
their labour and agricultural skills and plough the host com-
munity’s land in sharecropping arrangements. Sharecropping 
is a familiar custom among the hosts and refugees that started 
long before displacement. As a result of the amicable relation 
and long stay in the camp, many refugees own livestock that are 
grazing on the land of the host communities.
While no survey interviews were conducted with the Kunama 
in and around Shimelba camp, it is striking to see that almost 
three out of four (73%) of the refugees in Afar stated that they 
feel accepted by the locals and only 17 per cent felt rejected. 
This rate of self-perceived acceptance, which indicates suc-
cessful local integration and greater social cohesion, is much 
higher than the 20 per cent of refugees who feel accepted in 
Tigray. Our qualitative interviews in Afar underscore this 
finding. The Afar refugees in camps, settlements and rural 
out-of-camps sites have made multiple arrangements with the 
local hosting communities. In contrast to the Kunama, very few 
have managed to continue to herd livestock after arriving in 
Ethiopia. The condition of the pastoralist groups that often have 
to start with very few animals or none at all remains dire. Some, 
like in the Dalol settlement close to the border with Eritrea, 
barely have any livelihood options besides weaving mats, which 
also depends on local solidarity. Muna, a female Afar Eritrean 
refugee described this solidarity as follows: 
Those who have land allow us to take grass from it without 
any problem. We meet them [the hosts] when we go to cut 
and collect wood, and there we ask them if we can take 
grass, and they agree. The people here share everything 
they have. They cannot afford to help us like an organisa-
tion because they do not have the resources (…). They help 
us with everything they can (Sint-AAU-MG-033-ETH ).
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reliant. Imagine, until when should I depend on them? 
A man I met here who has become a good friend got me 
a business license under his name. I agreed to pay him 
some money every month. After working smoothly for two 
years, he increased the monthly payment several times in 
a year. Then, we disagreed, and I was forced to stop the 
business (Sint-AAU-FA-001-ETH).
Tekeste’s case shows that local interactions and networks 
created through persons encountered randomly resulted in a 
friendship that had supported his efforts to be self-reliant in an 
urban setting regardless of the eventual disagreement between 
him and his Ethiopian friend over different expectations.  
Concluding	remarks
In this section, we discussed the vital importance of context 
in Eritrean refugees’ interactions with the host communities. 
The three groups of Eritrean refugees have different political, 
socio-economic and demographic contexts that affect inter-per-
sonal, economic and cultural interactions at the local level. In 
general, commonalities are crucial in establishing interactions 
at individual or family levels. Among Afar and Kunama, where 
there is no political animosity across the border as among the 
Tigrinya, the commonalities compounded by experiences of 
victimhood and social organisations such as kinship shape 
solidarities among refugees and hosts. The Kunama were not 
able to garner similar benefits from their hosts as the Afar as 
their number in the host region was too small. The Afar who 
dominated the Afar regional state provided the Afar refugees 
with generous local support and facilitated local integration 
based on the clan order. In all cases, local solidarity helped the 
refugees, to varying extents, to cope with protracted displace-
ment situations or even to achieve de facto local integration.    
Key findings
•	 Historical antecedents, inter-ethnic relations, and 
current political respective economic context are factors 
that crucially shape and condition refugee–host interac-
tions. 
•	 Socio-cultural communalities usually facilitate interac-
tions at the level of individuals and households, lower 
barriers for local integration, and facilitates mutually 
beneficial cooperations. 
•	 Political solidarities by the host communities, com-
pounded by socio-cultural communalities not only 
support and foster refugee livelihoods but also help to 
counter restrictive central government policies.   
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and the economic situation in the town in general to the refu-
gees’ presence:
Those who sold Siwa [home-brewed local beer] before the 
establishment of the camp have now improved and devel-
oped to selling beer in their pubs. The women who had a 
small drinking house before have now shifted to a better 
business. Those who were running small shops now have 
big and well-organised shops. They have really changed 
(Sint-AAU-MG-017-ETH).
There is a similar local perception concerning the economic 
potentials linked to the presence of refugees in Hitsats. Jemal, a 
returnee from Saudi Arabia and originally from Adigrat (about 
180 km away) moved to Hitsats town exactly because a refugee 
camp was close by (Sint-AAU-FA-010-ETH). According 
to him, with the establishment of the camp, many business 
persons moved to the area to benefit from the opportunities 
created through the opening of the refugee camp (Sint-AAU-
FA-010-ETH). He now owns a shop and counts many refugees 
amongst his customers. Hitsats town, which was also built from 
scratch with the establishment of the camp, is now flourishing, 
according to its residents (Sint-AAU-FA-010-ETH)18.  
Joint ventures of refugees and host communities
The Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (see section 
3.1) focuses on the host community for the first time resulting in 
increased benefits. According to the CRRF, any social service 
provided by UNHCR and partner organisations must provide 
extra services, 25 per cent for the host community and 75 per 
cent for refugees (Atrafi, 2017). The new Ethiopian refugee 
proclamation (Proclamation1110/2019) supports such emphasis 
on the refugees and host communities. In line with this, host 
community members have recently benefited from health, 
educational, and other facilities provided to the refugees. De-
velopment initiatives by UNHCR and donor agencies aligned to 
the CRRF have been in progress in areas where local resources 
such as water and land can be relatively easily accessed for 
use. Currently, development incentives from the World Bank, 
UNHCR- FAO Collaboration Framework, and UNICEF target 
the refugee-hosting regions of Tigray, Afar, Somali, Gambella, 
Benishangul-Gumuz and Addis Ababa. While the projects in 
other regions have already started, progress in Tigray has been 
slow due to disputes over refugee governance between the cen-
tral and regional government in the last two years. 
18 In Tigray, it was clearly observable how host communities took advantage of 
the presence of refugees to commercialise their different goods and services 
with refugees. In other areas, like Gambella, it is estimated that hundreds of 
small businesses were created including retail shops, bakeries and tea rooms 
and others have been established since the beginning of the refugees‘ arrival. 
Different NGOs have been distributing cash and material support to benefi-
ciaries in refugee camps that helped to improve livelihoods and businesses 
throughout the region (Yonas, 2014; Endalkachew, 2016).
3.5	Seizing	opportunities:	Incentives	for	new	
economic	interactions
In recent years the public and academic debate on refugees and 
durable solutions, has witnessed a shift from understanding the 
refugees as victims without agency who have to be nourished 
and protected—a perspective that resulted in a care and main-
tenance approach—to understanding refugees as entrepreneurs 
who bring in new ideas and dynamics for local economic de-
velopment (Betts & Collier, 2015; Crisp, 2016; Papademetriou 
& Fratzke, 2016; Sanghi et al., 2016). According to our research 
findings, both are true: Protracted displacement situations are 
humanitarian emergencies that increase individual vulnerabili-
ties—and the persons affected show remarkable resilience. 
Development incentives and refugee economies in 
camp areas
According to an informant, Tigrayan authorities were well 
aware that the presence of refugees could potentially bring 
economic stimulus for the host communities when they estab-
lished the camps in areas considered economic backwater of the 
region:
When a camp was established around Mai Tsebri, the 
surrounding community opposed it. Then, top officials of 
the region came and discussed with the community. They 
said, “we thoughtfully selected this area for the camps to 
benefit the local community. Refugee camps will transform 
this locality, which is underdeveloped and does not have 
many resources, through different development projects 
that will target the refugees (Sint-AAU-FA-021-ETH).
Residents interviewed in Mai Tsebri said that the town has ben-
efitted a lot from the refugee camps. Mai Aini and Adi Harush 
camps together have been hosting over 50,000 refugees for 
over ten years. This large number of refugees created a market. 
Especially after the restrictions on their mobility out of camps 
were loosened, refugees became active consumers in the nearby 
towns. Many entrepreneurs have come to the area following the 
establishments of the camps and built structures such as busi-
ness centres, shops, hotels, bars, and internet cafés. Because 
of the refugees several, mostly international, aid organisations 
came to the area and contributed to the locality’s development, 
such as hotels for their staff. 
As a result, the economic activities in the town have picked up 
considerably. The town, which was just a village a decade ago, 
has seen commercial development with booming infrastructure 
and service sectors. Transportation infrastructures, schools and 
health facilities have been built from scratch. These develop-
ments have a direct impact on the economy and livelihood of 
the host community. Samira, who is a resident and a shop owner 
in Mai Tsebri town, attributes the improvement of her business 
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international debates on the resilience versus vulnerability of 
refugees are misleading. Our findings show that displaced persons 
do not only and continuously depend on aid— they are resilient 
and have developed coping strategies. In other words, aid and local 
resilience in combination help to lower the level of vulnerability.
Urban refugee economies and development  
opportunities in Ethiopia
Over 20,000 Eritrean refugees have been granted out-of-camp 
(OCP) benefits since 2010. As of 2020, the OCP beneficiaries are 
no longer expected to present a guarantor. However, officially, 
those entitled to OCP are expected to be self-reliant and forfeit all 
logistical support from UNHCR/ARRA. Nevertheless, most of 
them use this entitlement to circumvent the constraints that camp 
life puts on them. For instance, several refugees who are benefi-
ciaries of OCP we interviewed had started small businesses such 
as bars and shops in Addis Ababa. They started these businesses 
using the registration/licenses of their friends or distant relatives 
who are Ethiopian citizens. They make informal arrangements 
with these citizens and pay for their service. 
However, these arrangements often end in disputes due to 
diverging expectations like in Tekeste’s case (see section Role 
of local networks for securing livelihoods). Or like Michael, one 
of the urban refugees who got permission to stay in the capital 
because he could find a family member as a guarantor. Michael 
stated that this person expected some money in return. He used 
to live with his guarantor, but after some time, when Michael 
could no longer pay him, this person wanted him to move out. 
Michael was lucky to meet a stranger at a jebena coffee house 
by chance who asked about his problem. Finally, he offered 
Michael a small house to live in. 
Such accounts show case the degree to which refugees attempt 
to circumvent the constraints by the governance regime. These 
challenges show the urgency and crucial importance of imple-
menting the revised proclamation (Proclamation 1110/2019). 
Contrary to the widely held assumptions that urban refugees 
take jobs and markets off the host, recent studies reveal that 
they can contribute to host economies in many ways (Brown 
et al., 2018; Betts et al., 2019). Brown et al.’s (2018) study of 
urban refugee economies in Addis Ababa identifies five major 
development/economic contributions of urban refuges: Growing 
local markets and revenues as new arrivals become new clients 
for urban services, creation of new jobs and increase of human 
capital, discovery of new market opportunities and internation-
alisation of markets through remittances and cross-border trade. 
In other words, regardless of the multiple constraining factors, 
some refugees with entrepreneurial capacity can create jobs 
for themselves, contribute to the livelihoods of other refugees 
and even employ the locals. The case of Helen (Bint-AAU-MG-
024-ETH), a female Tigrinya refugee in Shire, illustrates this:
Helen’s exceptional case shows the contribution of refugee 
entrepreneurs to the economy, including the creation of jobs. 
In Afar, a mostly arid and comparatively economically un-
derdeveloped region, cooperation or alliances between the 
refugees and the host community come about mostly via the 
clan-based kinship system. A farmers’ cooperative founded 
by 15 refugees in Aysaita initiated a joint venture to produce 
cotton. Wanting to expand, they found 28 host community 
members who own 28 hectares of land and who were ready to 
join the cooperative by contributing their land. Mekane Yesus, 
a non-government organisation (NGO), that had already piloted 
such a joint venture with another group of refugees and hosts 
helped to organise the start-up. Mohammed is an Eritrean Afar 
who fled to Ethiopia with his family seven years ago and one 
of the members of the cotton joint venture. Currently, he lives 
in Aysaita refugee camp. According to him, the biggest hurdle 
for the project was to raise the start capital: “You cannot start 
[such] a business if you do not have any capital to start with,” 
he explained (Sint-AAU-MG-040-ETH).
Mohammed joined the group with the money he made as a day 
labourer and with what he had saved before: “I had money that I 
had saved after coming to Ethiopia and working in any job I could 
find. I would work [in] anything” (Sint-AAU-MG-040-ETH). 
After an agreement was found with the landowners, the NGO 
supported the cotton cooperative with ploughs, cottonseed, 
and pesticides. The refugees invested another 300,000 birr (US 
$9,000) mainly as payment for additional workers. In March 2020, 
after working on the land for six months, the cotton had grown 
well, the first harvest was collected and piled up, and negotiations 
with buyers advanced. All signs indicated that previous seasons’ 
results that had brought in a considerable amount of additional 
cash to the community would be met. The international NGOs in 
the area praised the project as a successful role model. 
The project is one of many examples that show how the arrival 
of refugees has changed the way of life for the locals to the 
better. Locals have profited from the presence of international 
NGOs, new jobs, new infrastructure and new ideas on methods 
of farming. The cooperative members’ entrepreneurship benefits 
themselves, the members of the host community and fellow 
refugees. Mohammed explained how the cooperation functions 
and which role hosts play:
Once we finish our work, we share the profit with the 
owners of the land. Even though they do not work for it, 
they get the money because it is their land. We have to 
give them 15 per cent from 100 per cent of our earnings 
(Sint-AAU-MG-040-ETH). 
In a context where the labour market offers minimal opportunities, 
the project offers refugees and host community members new jobs. 
Female refugees in Aysaita, for example, usually only produce and 
sell traditional palm frond mats. With the extra income generated 
by the sharecrop initiative, they can now augment the meagre 
ration provided in the camps, which, in turn, is benefitting Afar 
refugees who are not registered there. This case illustrates that 
Helen is an Eritrean refugee in her twenties who lives in Shire as an urban refugee. She lives with her younger sister who followed 
her over the border after the Ethiopian–Eritrean peace deal in 2019. Both sisters grew up in Asmara, the capital of Eritrea. Their 
mother left them at an early age and went to the Middle East. Finally, their mother ended up in the United States, but she never really 
succeeded in finding a stable income and could not support the family back home. Consequently, Helen worked from an early age on 
in different jobs such as bartender or waitress. Reaching eleventh grade, she was sent to the obligatory Sawa military training and 
served as a soldier for two years. Due to this experience, she decided to flee Eritrea: “The options you have [in Eritrea] are that you 
should either be with the government or hide and live secretly [or] otherwise leave the country.” 
After deciding to stay in Shire, while her friends left for Addis Ababa after some time in Hitsats, Helen thought of a business that did 
not require significant capital: She had the idea to make and sell coffee. She picked a location in a byway, in a guesthouse of a quiet 
neighbourhood where there was no business activity. Helen considered the place to be suitable for her business because it was close to 
a college and offered shade from the trees for some chairs and tables: “People do enjoy drinking coffee under trees. (… ) [yet] they are 
usually disturbed by the sound of cars. People prefer silence.” She could draw on her experience from having worked in a hotel in Asmara 
and managed to get permission to sell coffee on the verandah by assuring the building’s owner, an Ethiopian businessman, that this would 
increase the number of customers to his guesthouse. Helen also managed to quickly overcome administrative hurdles: She convinced her 
landlord to be her guarantor, and she got a confirmation from city council officials that she was eligible for a business license.
With the little money she had, Helen bought the necessary materials and started making and selling coffee. Combining her previous 
experiences with a good eye for local demand, her business picked up rapidly. She did so well that the guest house owner lent her 60,000 
birr (US $2,000) to expand her business. Helen bought additional furniture and materials such as chairs, a stove, refrigerator, roti maker, 
mixer, coffee, sugar to extend the service by offering small snacks. She then rented the room on the ground floor of the guest house for 
3,000 birr (US $100) per month. Even though it is only two by three metres big, she also used it as a bedroom and kitchen. The increasing 
number of customers changed the byway into a lively street. Ten new coffee shops opened in the area. But despite the competition, her 
shop remains a favourite spot for having coffee. Three months after she had borrowed the money, she paid back half of her debt. 
Within three more months, Helen had employed a local person and another refugee to help in the store, successfully promoted the 
guest house, had learnt how to produce soap, started selling it—and was about to open an indoors coffee shop next to a game centre. 
Seeing the benefit for the guest house and observing how she had turned the run-down street into a vivid recreational and com-
mercial space, another Ethiopian businessman proposed a deal to Helen where he would pay the expenses and she would provide 
customers and service. She rejoiced: “People always think money solves all problems—but if you work well, chances come to you!” 
The profits will be split equally; The business partner will cover the rent, the necessary kitchen equipment and the furniture while 
Helen will run the daily business and supervise the staff she plans to hire. At the same time, the old shop will be run by her sister and 
Helen’s friend who had gone to Addis but returned after she could not make it there (Bint-AAU-MG-024-ETH). 
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such as Shire and Addis Ababa, our study shows that refu-
gees contribute in multiple ways to and often even boost local 
economies. Local networks between refugees and community 
members play an important role in creating and enhancing 
economic development opportunities.
It is also a rare example of refugee–host solidarity and a busi-
ness partnership initiated without the mediation of any NGO 
or government. It underlines the importance of refugee-to-ref-
ugee connections in creating livelihoods for those in protracted 
displacement. Finally, it shows the “place-making” impact that 
refugees’ coping strategies can have by changing the commer-
cial, recreational and physical space they inhabit. 
Concluding	remarks
In this section, we discussed opportunities created through 
economic interactions with and among refugees. Refugees 
and hosts have developed innovative businesses in the refu-
gee-hosting regions of the country. This result contradicts the 
dominant discourse where refugees are portrayed as taking 
advantage of the hosts. Even though refugees still do not have a 
formal right to work, they play an active role in local economies 
in most camps and urban centres. In Afar, the refugee-initiated 
cotton joint venture not only showcases refugee–host soli-
darity but also serves as a base to learn from for future refugee 
integration. In Tigray, the presence of camps has changed 
the business and infrastructure landscape. In urban centres, 
Box	7:	A	new	street	of	coffee	houses
Key findings
•	 The presence of camps and refugees as well as national 
and international humanitarian staff contributes to the 
development of the local economy and infrastructure 
improvement. 
•	 Refugees often manage to circumvent the legal and 
administrative constraints successfully. They drive up 
the demand for urban services, bring in new skills and 
perspectives and support other refugees. 
•	 Refugees create new jobs by contributing to innova-
tive business ideas such as joint ventures that strongly 
benefit the local communities, changing the business 
landscape in the long-term.   
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“I have three friends [from the host community]. While 
passing by, they asked me for a drink of water. I invited 
them in. They accepted my offer. After they had washed 
their feet, we enjoyed coffee and lunch together. Then 
they left for their homes. Some other day, they brought 
me sorghum and other things. From that time onward, we 
continued and strengthened our friendships. I often go to 
their homes and visit them. They also do the same” (Bint-
AAU-MG-005-ETH). 
Respondents emphasised that such localised networks generate 
emotional and material support. Hewan stated that her intimate 
friendship with the local people enabled her to get firewood for 
a better price.
Our research often showed that the longer female refugees 
remain in camps, the more connections they have developed 
with other refugees or local hosts. Long-term neighbourhood 
often sets the basis for intimate friendships. In contrast, their 
connectivity to the world outside the immediate camp or settle-
ment environment is often the weaker the longer their immo-
bility lasts. However, since they rely heavily on local networks 
during protracted displacement, while these women are more 
dependent on local networks, they are often better connected 
locally than men. 
Refugees establish new translocal networks and seek to main-
tain relationships with their place of origin. Relationships may, 
however, change and even end over time. The economic stress 
of displacement and the nature of clandestine journeys affect 
social ties that had been strong before. Many of the stories gath-
ered throughout our research are explicitly gendered. Count-
less single women, most of them mothers, are stranded with 
neither financial nor social support—their hopes of moving 
have diminished to none. They are in fact completely immo-
bilised in situations of protracted vulnerability and precarity. 
Against the backdrop of Helen’s seemingly contradicting story, 
this shows the role of the structural handicaps women have to 
cope with: In most cases, women entered the migration process 
in a dependent position. Even though all individual cases are 
diverse, they can be grouped into proto-typical cases: One 
group of stranded female refugees followed their husbands for 
family reunification. Individual interviews with single mothers 
indicated that they had fled Eritrea with their spouse but 
lost contact after the husband engaged in secondary migra-
tion—often intending to reach Europe. A second group had 
connections with their spouse but lost them after fleeing with 
Most Eritrean refugees—in camps and urban settings—
struggle to survive and lead a life much below the standard of 
their aspiration. In general, the resilience of Eritrean refugees 
varies depending on family size, age, health, socio-economic 
status and gender. This section analyses cross-cutting findings 
on (a) factors that contribute to vulnerabilities and resilience, 
(b) reasons behind different patterns of mobility, and (c) the 
impact of socio-cultural commonalities that shape relationships 
between displaced persons and host communities.
4.1.	 	Gender,	vulnerability	and	resilience
Studies of networks often are gender-neutral and thus fail to 
disaggregate men and women’s networking strategies suffi-
ciently (Ryan, 2009). Neither the academic analysis of situa-
tions of displacement, the planning of humanitarian responses 
nor the implementation of assistance programmes would be 
able to respond to the diverse needs of displaced persons if 
gender were not taken into account. Our research has shown 
that female social networks are often tied to family spheres 
with a small circle of dense bonds and trusted relationships. 
Their frequent dependence on their parents and their traditional 
subordination to their husbands are reasons for this. How-
ever, there are many Eritrean women who came to Ethiopia or 
embarked from Ethiopia to Europe via irregular routes of their 
own volition. Family networks may also extend beyond con-
jugal and nuclear family units and involve siblings, cousins and 
other relatives. Beyond these (wider) family networks, women 
establish connections through activities that are regarded as tra-
ditional female responsibilities: Market places, mill houses and 
religious ceremonies (like mahbers)19  offer ample opportunities 
to establish a network of contacts with the host community. 
Mihret, an Eritrean refugee who lives in Hitsats refugee camp, 
established a friendship with a host community member that 
continues to the present and stresses the importance of “coinci-
dental acquaintances”: 
Do you know how many people go to the [local] rural 
area to attend weddings of their [local] friends? They [the 
locals] also come to the camp. There is a good relation-
ship [between them and us]” (Bint-AAU-MG-007-ETH). 
Hewan, a 51-year-old Eritrean refugee who has lived in Hitsats 
camp for the last six years, made friends among the host com-
munity quite by coincidence: 
19 A get-together among Orthodox Christians celebrated every year or it can be 
celebrated every month. During such events, people prepare feast and invite 
others. It plays a decisive role in creating harmonious social relations among 
members.
4.	Cross-cutting	findings	and	emerging	trends
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provided the refugees with productive resources such as access 
to land, jobs, etc., while the very significant minority Kunama 
was at least able to give the refugees access to sharecropping 
and emotional support. Camps inhabited by Kunama and Afar 
refugees are relatively stable in terms of population movement. 
Most of them flee to escape from the brutal Eritrean regime, 
and once they have arrived in the camps, they do not aspire 
to secondary migration, partly due to a lack of information, 
networks and financial means. Consequently, their chances to 
break free from external dependence and to end their protract-
edness are much smaller.
Tigrinya refugees, particularly those who have already made 
it to Addis Ababa, often have vast transnational networks with 
families and relatives scattered across multiple places (see 
Figure 9). They had been displaced at different times and fled to 
various locations within the last two decades or before. Com-
munication apps such as Messenger, Facebook and IMO enable 
their children to Ethiopia. According to our survey, 38 per cent 
of female refugees left Eritrea on their own, and 30 per cent 
of Eritrean women who fled had been separated from family 
members. Some explained to us that their husbands used to be 
the key sources of support, advice and information behind their 
decision to migrate, but the majority of 78 per cent remarked in 
the survey that they did not have any support from anyone for 
their journey.
The ruptures that they encountered on the move put them in a 
particularly vulnerable position: Their psychological well-being 
had deteriorated, their financial resources depleted, and they 
did not see any prospect to cope with or improve their situation. 
In fact, we found that a disproportionate number of women 
were falling into a downward spiral of mutually exacerbating 
factors of social isolation, poverty, sickness, loneliness, de-
pression and unemployment. Our survey also shows that only 
six per cent of female refugees have employment or informal 
work (compared to 11% of male Eritrean refugees). Women are 
thus more dependent on aid or other benefits from the state or 
humanitarian organisations. More female refugees are em-
bedded in transnational social figurations than displaced men 
(41% compared to 30%). Three out of ten women compared to 
two out of ten men primarily rely on the money sent from their 
spouse or other relatives abroad for their living. Further anal-
ysis of our survey data will help to identify the extent to which 
protractedness, precarious living conditions and transnational 
dependencies are related to gender and (ruptures in) family 
relations. 
4.2.	 Short	and	long-distance	trajectories
The Eritrean diasporic community is dominated by the Ti-
grinya ethnic group. The Afar and Kunama are known to have 
relatively limited transnational migration experience and a very 
small diaspora. Those who left first have had a clear influence 
on the question of whether refugees embark on short, medium, 
or long-distance trajectories. Trajectories change on the move 
and in time. This implies that more movements and being on the 
move longer often coincide with an enlarged horizon regarding 
the multiplicity of options. Recent changes in the pattern of and 
aspiration for movements among the Afar and Kunama have 
confirmed this. Some pioneers who had somewhat accidentally 
ended up in the United States or Canada spread the news—in 
person or via various information channels—about their expe-
riences. Since then, UNHCR has reported a significant increase 
in Afar and Kunama refugees showing an interest in resettling 
in—preferably—these countries, or any other for that matter. 
However, while expansive transnational networks are still rare 
(see the ‘Afar region’ in Figure 9), Afar and Kunama, whose 
transnational connectivity is weak, have strong local networks, 
and the solidarity from host communities is strong. The extent 
to which they benefit from local connectivity depends on the 
local political and economic resources. Local Afar networks 
Figure	9:	Transnational	connections	of	Eritrean	refugees	
from	three	study	regions		
Source:  TRAFIG survey data, n=394
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Another Afar, Mohammed, married with four children and 
working in a shared cotton farm close to Aysaita refugee camp, 
stressed how the belief that Afar in Ethiopia, Eritrea and Dji-
bouti share a common culture shapes the attitude towards the 
refugees: 
In Afar, ever since before, the haves share with the have-
nots. That is the culture. Even if we came here displaced, 
our language, religion and culture are the same. We do 
not have that many differences. We came here as a refu-
gees, and they are the landowners. So, they gave us what 
they have, and we did what we can and decided to coop-
erate and share the profits (Sint-AAU-MG-040-ETH).
The high level of solidarity is omnipresent in Afar. While the 
social obligation to share often means that more people have 
less (on average) for themselves, the mentioned cotton farm 
in Aysaita is a case in point for the potential of joining forces. 
They are not the only ones who benefit from the cooperation's 
entrepreneurship; the other host community members and 
fellow refugees do too. This includes female refugees who are 
usually mainly limited to making and selling traditional palm 
frond mats and those Afar refugees without registration staying 
in the camp (and who do not receive an official ration).
These cases show that a shared common language, culture and 
religion can contribute to peaceful coexistence. The relations 
between the Tigrinya from both sides of the borders does not 
disprove this. Instead, it sheds light on the role politics play in 
reshaping relationships regardless of commonalities
them to remain connected with transnational family members20. 
Resources, as well as responsibilities, are frequently distrib-
uted among family members or households across these places. 
Displaced people’s mobility is often situated in the logic of 
families and broader social networks and hinge on pre-existing 
and recently (continuously) formed patterns of connectivity. 
Yordanos’ family network and connectivity (Box 5) scattered 
across multiple locations in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sweden, Switzer- 
land and Canada is a case in point that shows how pathways 
form during movements and how aspirations are influenced by 
the examples of those on the move.
4.3.	 Belonging,	suspicion	and	solidarity
In Afar, informants repeatedly emphasised that regardless 
of which country they live in, they are Afar—a factor that is 
crucial for the shape of the local refugee-host community. The 
commonalities in language, religion, and cultural practices 
are compounded by strong clan relationships in Afar's pas-
toral community. Zainab, an Afar from Eritrea, emotionally 
described this strong bond: 
We thank God since coming here. The community has 
treated us like brothers and sisters. They have not given 
us any trouble. I go to many places [within Afar] I go to 
get wood, and I never get any resistance from the local 
people. When we want to sell our products, they let us be 
and do not fight with us over territory. They are Afar like 
us, and we speak the same language. So we live peacefully 
(Sint-AAU-MG-034-ETH). 
In Tigray, the Tigriyna refugees focus on individual inter-
actions and sometimes complain that Tigrayan officials and 
institutions are not as welcoming as individuals they interact 
with at the markets or religious locations. To the contrary, in 
Afar regional state, the Eritrean Afar refugees reported feeling 
at home, including administrative institutions. While tensions 
between the refugee and the hosting communities occur, there 
was no reported case of any of these tensions being grounded 
in generalised suspicions or reservations related to the status 
of being Eritrean Afar. In contrast to the intra-ethnic political 
animosities and ambivalent trust relations between Tigrinya 
speakers in Eritrea and Tigray, there is a high level of trust, 
cohesion and intra-ethnic solidarity between ethnic Afar from 
Eritrea, Ethiopia or Djibouti. In other words: While relations 
between Trigrinya speakers are varying in each individual case, 
Afar solidarity is a strict social obligation without alternatives 
and therefore virtually universal.
20 Until the second half of 2019, before the Ethiopian government allowed for ref-
ugees to access telecommunications themselves, refugees organised telephone 
SIM cards through personal connections. Usually, refugees had to visit nearby 
towns to get access to the Internet from Internet cafes. Due to the high demand 
for communication the Internet café business also increased in these towns.
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Onward	movements
A refugee’s networks and connectivity primarily determine 
their capability to move onward from life in a camp. For those 
who have a well-established network, camps are just a transit 
space where they process their onward mobility. Yet, those who 
do not have such high-quality connections (connectivity that 
brings information and resources to move on) suffer more from 
the effects of protracted displacement—and are more suscep-
tible to experiencing intractable periods of waiting, diminished 
livelihood options and a generally increased vulnerability. Our 
research reveals that mobility and translocal connectivity need 
to be put in the context of previous histories of migration, bonds 
and alliances with the host communities, and finally, the state of 
current political affairs. 
Furthermore, our research shows that displaced people depend 
on their connections to secure access to any kind of employ-
ment. This holds for contacts and information and for being 
able to move outside the camp—sponsored by family, friends 
and relatives in Eritrea, Ethiopia or the diaspora. Displaced 
persons find employment in locally owned businesses, such as 
garages, shops, factories, as hairdressers or waiters in cafeterias 
(cf. Brown et al., 2018). Opportunities for such jobs are higher 
in bigger cities such as Addis. Yet refugees access these jobs 
informally, and arrangements often involve risky behaviour and 
exploitation. The recent shift in the country’s national refugee 
policy following the CRRF is likely to grant greater freedom of 
movement and work opportunities. 
Belonging	and	politics
Besides connectivity and mobility, there are two other issues 
that, according to our research, crucially shape the current 
situation and future prospects of refugees’ integration: The 
question of belonging as illustrated by our analysis of the differ-
ences between Tigrinyas and Afar or Kunama, and the role of 
political factors as verified by the outbreak of the recent armed 
conflict in Tigray. None of these issues are directly related 
to national and international refugee policies. Yet, all have a 
decisive impact on refugees’ everyday life and their broader 
‘transnational figuration of displacement’. While the position, 
perception and options that Eritreans have had in Tigray, Afar 
and Addis are determined largely by the perception, suspicions 
or obligations projected towards them by the locals, the current 
armed conflict in Tigray demonstrates the limits of any models 
of mobility or connectivity. 
In this working paper, we highlighted the role refugees’ 
connectivity and mobility plays in refugees’ everyday lives and 
as a solution to protracted displacement situations. Our empir-
ical data comes from fieldwork in multiple refugee camps in 
northern and north-eastern Ethiopia and urban spaces. It clearly 
shows staggering differences between those who have networks 
and those who do not. Our results indicate that those who man-
aged to leave Eritrea and transit camps to third-country desti-
nations support family members and others in following their 
example, while those who had been stuck in the refugee camp 
for extended periods often had to cope with decreasing options 
of moving on. Both trends were found to reinforce themselves 
over time. The direction and options of movement—to another 
country and out of a refugee camp—and the time in displacement 
and the depth of protractedness directly depend on the extent 
and quality of a refugee’s social network relations. Another 
significant result of the research is that unexpected ruptures 
that happen at different stages of refugees’ mobility exacerbate 
refugees' vulnerability. The economic stress of displacement 
and the fragmented nature of clandestine journeys cause friction 
and vicious circles of debt and poverty that have a considerable 
impact on family and other social ties. Here again, women who 
have to take care of their children or aged or disabled kin are 
often more severely affected than others.
We have observed this difference not only between individuals 
but also between groups. Tigrinya groups with their long his-
tory of mobility have developed better transnational connec-
tivity. This high level of connectivity is conducive to efforts 
to get out of situations of limbo in Ethiopia. Other groups, 
such as the Kunama or Afar, have not yet developed the same 
degree of transnational connectivity. Some of them spent nearly 
two decades in refugee camps in a stranded situation. Both 
groups did not aspire to resettle in the developed world or opt 
for secondary migration. According to official sources, many 
Kunama had previously been opposed to travelling to North 
America or Europe (Eint-BICC-MR-002-ETH). According to 
our findings, this was just due to a shortage of networks and 
lack of orientation towards international migration. This has 
recently changed: The first Kunama and Afar who profited from 
resettlement schemes have come back to tell their stories. As a 
result, the groups’ attitude towards onward movements seems 
to change quickly. Recently, a group of Kunama secured reset-
tlement to North America (Eint-BICC-MR-002-ETH). 
Conclusion
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Given recent developments, the situation of Eritrean refugees 
has become more complicated. They find themselves increas-
ingly trapped between a rock and a hard place. The area where 
the camps are located is a flashpoint of military conflict. 
According to reports from Eritrean refugees, the administration 
of the camps in Tigray collapsed after the fighting broke out. 
Camp officials fled, and food or aid supplies failed to arrive. As 
a particularly exposed and vulnerable group, Eritrean refugees 
sheltering in camps near the border are caught between all 
fronts. On the one hand, they fear that lines get blurred in the 
heat of the conflict, yet, on the other hand, they are afraid of 
the involvement of Eritrean forces, which would bring them in 
direct contact with the force they had fled from. Even before 
the conflict in Tigray broke out in late 2020, the refugees had 
become a pawn in political battles between the central and 
regional governments. This illustrates the dualism of refugee 
agency and political structures in protracted displacement situ-
ations described throughout the working paper: the figurations 
of displacement in and beyond Ethiopia are constantly trans-
formed due to refugees’ own actions and the networks that they 
spin to secure their lives, as well as wider political conflicts and 
shifting refugee policies.
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